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AbstractWe introduce a simple class of mean field games with
absorbing boundary over a finite time horizon. In the corresponding
N-player games, the evolution of players’ states is described by a sys-
tem of weakly interacting Itoˆ equations with absorption on first exit
from a bounded open set. Once a player exits, her/his contribution
is removed from the empirical measure of the system. Players thus
interact through a renormalized empirical measure. In the definition
of solution to the mean field game, the renormalization appears in
form of a conditional law. We justify our definition of solution in
the usual way, that is, by showing that a solution of the mean field
game induces approximate Nash equilibria for the N-player games
with approximation error tending to zero as N tends to infinity. This
convergence is established provided the diffusion coefficient is non-
degenerate. The degenerate case is more delicate and gives rise to
counter-examples.
1. Introduction. Mean field games (MFGs, henceforth) were intro-
duced by Lasry and Lions [32, 33, 34] and, independently, by Huang et al.
[23], as limit models for symmetric nonzero-sum non-cooperative N -player
games with interaction of mean field type as the number of players tends to
infinity. The limit relation is commonly understood in the sense that a so-
lution of the MFG allows to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the
corresponding N -player games if N is sufficiently large; see, for instance,
Huang et al. [23], Kolokoltsov et al. [26], Carmona and Delarue [5], and
Carmona and Lacker [7]. This approximation result is useful from a practi-
cal point of view since the model of interest is commonly the N -player game
with N very large so that a direct computation of Nash equilibria is not
feasible.
The purpose of this paper is to study N -player games and related MFGs
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in the presence of an absorbing set. Thus, a player is eliminated from the
N -player game as soon as her/his private state process leaves a given open
set O ⊂ Rd, the set of non-absorbing states, which is the same for all players.
We carry out our study for a simple class of continuous-time models with
Itoˆ-type dynamics with mean field interaction over a bounded time horizon.
More specifically, the vector of private states XN = (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) in the
N -player game is assumed to evolve according to
XNi (t) = X
N
i (0) +
∫ t
0
(
ui(s,X
N ) + b¯
(
t,XNi (t),
∫
Rd
w(y)piN (s, dy)
))
ds
+ σWNi (t), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(1.1)
where u = (u1, . . . , uN ) is a vector of feedback strategies with full state infor-
mation (to be specified below),WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N are independent d-dimensional
Wiener processes defined on some filtered probability space, σ is some dis-
persion matrix, which we assume to be constant for simplicity, and b¯, w are
given deterministic functions. Moreover, piN (t, ·) is the (random) empirical
measure of the players’ states at time t that have not left O, that is,
piN (t, ·)
.
=


1
N¯N (t)
∑N
j=1 1
[0,τ
XN
j )
(t) · δXNj (t)
(·) if N¯N (t) > 0,
δ0(·) if N¯
N (t) = 0,
where N¯N (t)
.
=
∑N
j=1 1
[0,τ
XN
j )
(t) is the number of players still in the game
at time t and
τX
N
j
.
= inf
{
t ∈ [0, T ] : XNj (t) /∈ O
}
,
denotes the time of first exit of XNj from O, with the convention inf ∅ =∞.
By definition, piN (t, ·) equals the Dirac measure in 0 ∈ Rd if all players have
left O by time t. The choice of δ0 in this case is arbitrary and has no impact
on the game; this will be clear from the definition of the cost functionals JNi
below. Heuristically, when some player exits the set O, he/she does not con-
tribute anymore to the empirical measure piN (t, ·), which is computed with
respect to the “survivors” only. Notice that the controls appear linearly in
(1.1) only for the sake of simplicity. Even though more general dependencies
could be considered, we do not aim at giving the minimal set of assumptions
under which our results hold true.
Each player wants to minimize expected costs according to a given cost
functional over the random time horizon determined as the minimum be-
tween the player’s time of first exit from O
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T . More precisely, player i evaluates a strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN )
according to
JNi (u)
.
= E
[∫ τNi
0
f
(
s,XNi (s),
∫
Rd
w(y)piN (s, dy), ui
(
s,XN
))
ds
+ F
(
τNi ,X
N
i (τ
N
i )
)]
,
whereXN is the solution of Eq. (1.1) under u and τNi
.
= τX
N
i ∧T is the (ran-
dom) duration of the game for player i. Notice that the cost coefficients f , F
are the same for all players. As in the dynamics, we have mean field interac-
tion in the costs through the renormalized empirical measures piN (t, ·). For
simplicity, we only consider finite-dimensional dependencies on the measure
variable, namely through integrals of the vector-valued function w. More
details on the setting with all the technical assumptions will be given in the
next sections.
The presence of an absorbing set can be motivated by economic models
for credit risk and corporate finance. There, the players can be interpreted as
interacting firms striving to maximize some objective functional, for instance
the expected value of discounted future dividends, or as banks controlling
their rate of borrowing/lending to a central bank as in the systemic risk
model proposed by Carmona et al. [6]. Within both contexts, the absorbing
boundary can be naturally seen as a default barrier as in structural models
for credit risk. In this paper, we concentrate on the mathematical properties
of this family of games, while we postpone their possible applications to
future research.
For our class of games, we focus on the construction of approximate Nash
equilibria for the N -player games through solutions of the corresponding
MFG. Our main contributions are as follows:
• We introduce the limit model corresponding to the above N -player
games as N →∞, namely the MFG with absorption. For a solution of
the MFG, the renormalized empirical measures piN (t, ·) are replaced
by a flow of conditional laws; see Definition 4.1.
• Under a non-degeneracy condition on the dispersion matrix σ, we prove
that any regular feedback solution of the MFG induces a sequence of
approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player games with approxima-
tion error tending to zero as N →∞; see Theorem 5.1. Here, “regular”
means that the optimal feedback strategy is (almost surely) continuous
with respect to the state variable.
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• Under the same non-degeneracy condition on σ, we prove existence of
a solution in feedback form to the MFG with absorption; see Theo-
rem 6.2. Moreover, under some additional conditions, we show that the
optimal feedback strategies are Markovian and continuous in the state
variable; see Proposition 6.1 and Corollary 6.3. In that situation, we
briefly sketch what would be the PDE approach to mean field games
with absorption.
• In the degenerate case, i.e. when σ may vanish, we provide a counter-
example where the solution of the limit MFG is not even nearly optimal
(in the sense of inducing approximate Nash equilibria) for theN -player
games. This is in contrast with what happens in the absence of an
absorbing set.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 on approximate Nash equilibria is based on
weak convergence arguments, controlled martingale problems and a reformu-
lation of the original dynamics and costs using path-dependent coefficients;
see, in particular, (3.2) and (5.4). This allows to work with solutions defined
over the entire time interval [0, T ]. The resulting description of the systems
should be compared to the set-up used in Carmona and Lacker [7]. There,
questions of existence and uniqueness of solutions finite horizon MFGs with
non-degenerate noise and functional coefficients are studied through proba-
bilistic methods, and approximate Nash equilibria are constructed from the
MFG. Nonetheless, the results of Carmona and Lacker [7] cannot be applied
directly to our situation, due in part to different continuity assumptions.
What is more, approximate Nash equilibria are constructed there only for
dynamics without mean field interaction [7, Theorem 4.2]; this assumption
implies an independence property not warranted in more general situations.
The use of martingale problems in proving convergence to the McKean-
Vlasov limit and propagation of chaos for weakly interacting systems has
a long tradition; see, for instance, Funaki [18], Oelschla¨ger [36], or Me´le´ard
[35]. In those works, the N -particle systems are usually assumed to be fully
symmetric, and the dynamics of all particles are determined by the same
coefficients. Here, we have to study the passage to the many player (par-
ticle) limit also in the presence of a deviating player, which destroys the
symmetry of the prelimit systems. The absorbing boundary introduces a
discontinuity into the dynamics so that a single deviating player might have
a non-negligible effect on the limit behavior of the N -player empirical mea-
sures. This is the reason why we give a detailed proof of convergence in
Appendix B.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 on existence of a feedback solution for the limit
MFG is based on results on BSDEs with random terminal horizon as in
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Darling and Pardoux [12], Briand and Hu [4] and the use of the Brouwer-
Schauder-Tychonov fixed point theorem applied to a suitable map in the
same spirit as Carmona and Lacker [7]. For the continuity of the optimal
feedback strategy, we rely on the classical PDE approach to optimal control
and adapt to our setting the proof of a regularity result due to Fleming and
Rishel [17].
For the counter-example (given in Section 7), we consider systems with
dispersion coefficient σ equal to zero; the only source of randomness comes
from the initial conditions. We construct, for a specific choice of the initial
distribution, a feedback solution of the MFG that is Lipschitz continuous
in the state variable and such that the induced strategy vectors are not
asymptotically optimal for the corresponding N -player games. The reason
for this non-convergence is a change in the controllability of the individual
player dynamics between limit and prelimit systems in conjunction with the
discontinuity of the costs introduced by the absorbing boundary. Also notice
that the initial distribution we choose is singular with respect to Lebesgue
measure. The counter-example thus holds little surprise from the point of
view of optimal control theory. In the context of MFGs without absorption,
on the other hand, the connection between solutions of the limit MFG and
approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player games is known to be robust
and persists even for systems with fully degenerate noise; see Theorem 2.11
in Lacker [31] for a general result in this direction. From this point of view,
the counter-example seems to be interesting.
Related literature. Mean-field models similar to ours have been studied
before in different contexts. In a first group of papers, such as Giesecke
et al. [19], Spiliopoulos et al. [38], Giesecke et al. [20], a point process model
of correlated defaults timing in a portfolio of firms has been introduced.
More specifically, a firm defaults with some intensity which follows a mean-
reverting jump-diffusion process that is driven by several terms, one of them
being the default rate in the pool. This naturally induces a mean-field among
the default intensities: every time one firm defaults a jump occurs in the
default rate of the pool and hence in the intensities of the survivors. The
effects of defaults fade away with time. A law of large number (LLN) for the
default rate as the number N of firms goes to infinity is proved in Giesecke
et al. [19], while other results on the loss from default are analyzed in the
companion papers Spiliopoulos et al. [38], Giesecke et al. [20]. Similar results
have been obtained for the interacting particle models proposed by Cvitanic´
et al. [10] and by Dai Pra et al. [11], where the effect of defaults on the
survivors is permanent.
Apart from the fact that their setting is not controlled, the main difference
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between our model and theirs is that whenever, in our model, some diffusion
is absorbed and the conditional empirical measure is updated accordingly,
the diffusions still in O are affected by it in a continuous way since the
empirical measure appears only in the drift coefficient. Moreover, while in
the setting of Giesecke, Spiliopoulos and coauthors the intensities can have
a common noise, this is not included in our model for the sake of simplicity.
More recently, Hambly and Ledger [22], motivated by various applications
from large credit portfolios to neuroscience, have proposed a system of N
uncontrolled diffusions that are killed as soon as they go negative. Further-
more, their coefficients are functions of the current proportional loss, which
is defined as the proportion out of N of killed diffusion. They prove a LLN
for the empirical measure of the population using some energy estimates in
combination with weak convergence techniques.
Two more papers, which are related to ours, are those by Delarue et al. [13,
14]. Motivated by applications in neuroscience, these authors study the well-
posedness of an integrate-and-fire model and its approximation via particle
systems. Mathematically speaking, they look at a nonlinear scalar SDE with
a jump component responsible for resetting trajectories as soon as they hit a
given threshold (occurrence of a “spike”) and a singular drift term of mean
field type (the “nonlinear” interaction) depending on the average number of
spikes before current time. When the nonlinear interaction is too strong, any
solution can have a blow-up in finite time. In our model, we could have a
similar cascade effect, which would correspond to a situation when all players
get absorbed before the finite horizon T . Investigating such a phenomenon
in our setting is interesting on its own but goes beyond the scope of this
paper.
In the applied literature, MFGs with absorption at zero have been re-
cently considered in [8, 9] within the context of oligopolistic models with
exhaustible resources. A common feature that their model shares with ours
is that they also keep track of the fraction of active players remaining at
time t, which appears in the objective functions (through the control) but
not in the state variable. Moreover, they look at some particular cases, which
are relevant from an economic perspective, and perform some asymptotic ex-
pansions corresponding to the case of “small competition”. A rigorous study
addressing existence and uniqueness issues in Chan and Sircar’s model has
been subsequently done by [21].
The last work we mention here is by Bensoussan et al. [3] and bears a
different relation to ours. There, the authors construct Nash equilibria using
PDE methods for a class of stochastic differential games with a varying
number of players (the dynamics are not of mean field type). While the
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maximum number of players is prescribed, players may leave the game (be
pushed out or “die”), and new players may join. In our case, we only allow
players to leave (through absorption). A natural extension of our model
would include a mechanism by which players enter the game.
Structure of the paper. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces some terminology and notation and sets the main assump-
tions on the dynamics as well as on the cost functionals. Section 3 describes
the setting of N -player games with absorption, while Section 4 introduces
the corresponding MFG. In Section 5, one of the main results, namely the
construction of approximate Nash equilibria for the N -player game from a
solution of the limit problem, is stated and proved. Section 6 contains the
results on the existence of (regular) feedback solutions for the MFG, in par-
ticular those with Markov feedback controls, as well as a sketch of the PDE
approach to mean field games with absorption. In Section 7, we provide the
aforementioned counter-example in the case of degenerate noise. The tech-
nical results used in the paper are all gathered in the Appendix, including
the aforementioned propagation-of-chaos-type results in Appendix B and a
uniqueness result for McKean-Vlasov equations in Appendix C.
2. Preliminaries and assumptions. Let d ∈ N, which will be the
dimension of the space of private states, noise values, as well as control
actions. The spaces Rn with n ∈ N are equipped with the standard Euclidean
norm, always indicated by |.|. Choose T > 0, the finite time horizon.
For S a Polish space, let P(S) denote the space of probability measures
on B(S), the Borel sets of S. For s ∈ S, let δs indicate the Dirac measure
concentrated in s. Equip P(S) with the topology of weak convergence of
probability measures. Then P(S) is again a Polish space.
Set X
.
= C([0, T ],Rd), which can be seen as the space of individual state
trajectories. As usual, equip X with the topology of uniform convergence,
which turns it into a Polish space. Let ‖ · ‖X denote the supremum norm on
X . Denote by Xˆ the coordinate process on X :
Xˆ(t, ϕ)
.
= ϕ(t), t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ ∈ X .
Let (Gt) be the canonical filtration in B(X ), that is,
Gt
.
= σ
(
Xˆ(s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Given N ∈ N, we will use the usual identification of XN = ×NX with
the space C([0, T ],RN ·d); XN , too, will be equipped with the topology of
uniform convergence. We call a function u defined on [0, T ]×XN with values
8 L. CAMPI AND M. FISCHER
in some measurable space progressively measurable if u is measurable and,
for every t ∈ [0, T ], all ϕ, ϕ˜ ∈ XN ,
u(t,ϕ) = u(t, ϕ˜) whenever ϕ(s) = ϕ˜(s) for all s ∈ [0, t].
Let Γ be a closed subset of Rd, the set of control actions, or action space.
Let O ⊂ Rd be an open set, the set of non-absorbing states. For Y an
R
d-valued process defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) over the time
interval [0, T ], let
τY (ω)
.
= inf {t ∈ [0, T ] : Y (t, ω) /∈ O} , ω ∈ Ω,
denote the random time of first exit of Y from O, with the convention
inf ∅ =∞. Clearly, if Y has continuous trajectories and is adapted to some
filtration (Ft) in F , then τ
Y is an (Ft)-stopping time. In this case, τ
Y =
inf {t ∈ [0, T ] : Y (t) ∈ ∂O}, where ∂O denotes the boundary of O.
Let d0 ∈ N, and let w : R
d → Rd0 ,
b¯ : [0, T ]× Rd × Rd0 → Rd, σ ∈ Rd×d,
f : [0, T ]× Rd × Rd0 × Γ→ [0,∞), F : [0, T ]× Rd → [0,∞).
The function w will denote an integrand for the measure variable in the drift
and the running costs, respectively, b¯ a function of the drift integral, σ the
dispersion coefficient of the dynamics, while f , F quantify the running and
terminal costs, respectively. Notice that the dispersion coefficient σ is a con-
stant matrix and that the cost coefficients f , F are non-negative functions.
Let us make the following assumptions:
(H1) Boundedness and measurability: w, b¯, f , F are Borel measurable func-
tions uniformly bounded by some constant K > 0.
(H2) Continuity: w, f , F are continuous, and b¯(t, ·, ·) is continuous, uni-
formly in t ∈ [0, T ].
(H3) Lipschitz continuity of b¯: there exists L¯ > 0 such that for all x, x˜ ∈ Rd,
y, y˜ ∈ Rd0 ,
sup
t∈[0,T ]
∣∣b¯(t, x, y) − b¯(t, x˜, y˜)∣∣ ≤ L¯ (|x− x˜|+ |y − y˜|) .
(H4) Action space: Γ ⊂ Rd is compact and convex (and non-empty).
(H5) State space: O ⊂ Rd is non-empty, open, and bounded such that ∂O
is a C2-manifold.
The results of Sections 5 and 6 will be established under the following
additional assumption:
(ND) Non-degeneracy: σ is a matrix of full rank.
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3. N-player games. Let N ∈ N be the number of players. Denote by
XNi (t) the private state of player i at time t ∈ [0, T ]. The evolution of the
players’ states depends on the strategies they choose as well as the initial
distribution of states, which we indicate by νN (thus, νN ∈ P(R
N×d)). We
assume that supp(νN ) ⊂ ×
NO and that νN is symmetric in the sense that
νN ◦ s−1 = νN
for all maps s : (Rd)N → (Rd)N of the form (x1, . . . , xN ) 7→ (xp(1), . . . , xp(N))
for some permutation p of (1, . . . , N).
Here, we consider players using feedback strategies with full state in-
formation (up to the current time). Thus, let UN denote the set of all
progressively measurable functions u : [0, T ] × XN → Γ. Elements of UN
represent individual strategies. A vector (u1, . . . , uN ) of individual strate-
gies is called a strategy vector or strategy profile. Given a strategy vector
u = (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ ×NUN , consider the system of equations
XNi (t) = X
N
i (0) +
∫ t
0
(
ui(s,X
N ) + b¯
(
s,XNi (s),
∫
Rd
w(y)piN (s, dy)
))
ds
+ σWNi (t), t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3.1)
where XN = (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ), W
N
1 , . . . ,W
N
N are independent d-dimensional
Wiener processes defined on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P)
and piN (t, ·) is the empirical measure of the players’ states at time t that
have not left O, that is,
piNω (t, ·)
.
=


1
N¯Nω (t)
∑N
j=1 1
[0,τ
XN
j (ω))
(t) · δXNj (t,ω)
(·) if N¯Nω (t) > 0,
δ0(·) if N¯
N
ω (t) = 0,
where
N¯Nω (t)
.
=
N∑
j=1
1
[0,τ
XN
j (ω))
(t), ω ∈ Ω.
It will be convenient to rewrite (3.1) as a system of particles interacting
through their unconditional empirical measure on the path space. To this
end, set τ
.
= τ Xˆ , that is,
τ(ϕ)
.
= inf {t ∈ [0, T ] : ϕ(t) /∈ O} , ϕ ∈ X ,
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and define b : [0, T ] × X × P(X )× Γ→ Rd by
(3.2)
b(t, ϕ, θ, γ)
.
=

γ + b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
)
if θ(τ > t) > 0,
γ + b¯ (t, ϕ(t), w(0)) if θ(τ > t) = 0.
Then b is measurable and progressive in the sense that, for all t ∈ [0, T ], all
γ ∈ Γ,
b(t, ϕ, θ, γ) = b(t, ϕ˜, θ˜, γ) whenever ϕ|[0,t] = ϕ˜|[0,t] and θ|Gt = θ˜|Gt.
The solutions of (3.1) are thus equivalently described by:
XNi (t) = X
N
i (0) +
∫ t
0
b
(
s,XNi , µ
N , ui(s,X
N )
)
ds+ σWNi (t),
t ∈ [0, T ], i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
(3.3)
where WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N are independent d-dimensional Wiener processes de-
fined on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P), and µ
N is the em-
pirical measure of the players’ state trajectories, that is,
µNω (B)
.
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXN
j
(·,ω)(B), B ∈ B(X ), ω ∈ Ω.
A solution of Eq. (3.1) (equivalently, of Eq. (3.3)) under u ∈ ×NUN with
initial distribution νN is therefore a triple ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W
N ,XN ) where
(Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a filtered probability space satisfying the usual hypotheses,
WN = (WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N ) a vector of independent d-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener
processes, and XN = (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) a vector of continuous R
d-valued (Ft)-
adapted processes such that Eq. (3.1) (resp. Eq. (3.3)) holds P-almost surely
with strategy vector u and P ◦(XN (0))−1 = νN .
Let UNfb be the set of all strategy vectors u ∈ ×
NUN such that Eq. (3.1)
under u with initial distribution νN possesses a solution that is unique in
law. If the non-degeneracy assumption (ND) holds in addition to (H1) – (H5),
then Eq. (3.1) is well posed given any strategy vector:
Proposition 3.1. Grant (ND) in addition to (H1) – (H5). Then UNfb =
×NUN .
Proof. Let u ∈ ×NUN . The system of equations (3.3) can be rewritten
as one stochastic differential equation with state space RN×d driven by an
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N×d-dimensional standard Wiener process with drift coefficient bu : [0, T ]×
XN → RN×d given by
bu(t,ϕ)
.
=

b

t, ϕ1, 1
N
N∑
j=1
δϕj , u1(s,ϕ)

 , . . . , b

t, ϕN , 1
N
N∑
j=1
δϕj , uN (s,ϕ)



T
and non-degenerate constant diffusion coefficient. Notice that bu is bounded
and progressive with respect to the natural filtration in B(XN ). Existence of
a weak solution and uniqueness in law are now a consequence of Girsanov’s
theorem and the Stroock-Varadhan martingale problem; cf. V.27 in Rogers
and Williams [37, pp. 177-178].
The i-th player evaluates a strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ U
N
fb ac-
cording to the cost functional
JNi (u)
.
= E
[∫ τNi
0
f
(
s,XNi (s),
∫
Rd
w(y)piN (s, dy), ui
(
s,XN
))
ds
+ F
(
τNi ,X
N
i (τ
N
i )
)]
,
where XN = (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ) and ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W
N ,XN ) is a solution of
Eq. (3.1) under u with initial distribution νN ,
τNi (ω)
.
= τX
N
i (ω) ∧ T, ω ∈ Ω,
the random time horizon for player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and piN (·) the conditional
empirical measure process induced by (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N ). The cost functional is
well defined, and it is finite thanks to assumption (H1).
Given a strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) and an individual strategy v ∈
UN , let [u
−i, v]
.
= (u1, . . . , ui−1, v, ui+1, . . . , uN ) indicate the strategy vector
that is obtained from u by replacing ui, the strategy of player i, with v.
Definition 3.1. Let ε ≥ 0. A strategy vector u = (u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ U
N
fb
is called an ε-Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if for every i ∈
{1, . . . , N}, every v ∈ UN such that [u
−i, v] ∈ UNfb,
(3.4) JNi (u) ≤ J
N
i
(
[u−i, v]
)
+ ε.
If u is an ε-Nash equilibrium with ε = 0, then u is called a Nash equilib-
rium.
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According to Definition 3.1, we consider the Nash equilibrium property
with respect to feedback strategies with full state information (i.e., the states
of the vector of individual processes up to current time).
4. Mean field games. LetM denote the space of measurable flows of
measures, that is,
M
.
=
{
p : [0, T ]→ P(Rd) : p is Borel measurable
}
.
Given a flow of measures p ∈ M and a feedback strategy u ∈ U1, consider
the equation
X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
(
u(s,X) + b¯
(
s,X(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy)
))
ds
+ σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(4.1)
where W is a d-dimensional Wiener process defined on some filtered proba-
bility space (Ω,F , (Ft),P).
Let Ufb denote the set of all feedback strategies u ∈ U1 such that Eq. (4.1)
possesses a solution that is unique in law given any initial distribution with
support contained in O.
Proposition 4.1. Grant (ND) in addition to (H1) – (H5). Then Ufb =
U1.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness in law are again a consequence of Gir-
sanov’s theorem; cf. Proposition 3.1.
The costs associated with a strategy u ∈ Ufb, a flow of measures p, and
an initial distribution ν ∈ P(Rd) with support in O are given by
J(ν, u; p)
.
= E
[∫ τ
0
f
(
s,X(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy), u(s,X)
)
ds
+ F (τ,X(τ))
]
,
where ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) is a solution of (4.1) under u with initial dis-
tribution ν, and τ
.
= τX ∧ T the random time horizon.
We will measure the minimal costs with respect to a class of stochastic
open-loop strategies. To this end, let A denote the set of all quadruples
((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) such that (Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a filtered probability
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space satisfying the usual hypotheses, ξ an F0-measurable random variable
with values in O, α a Γ-valued (Ft)-progressively measurable process, and
W a d-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener process. Any strategy u ∈ Ufb, together
with an initial distribution, induces an element of A.
Given ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) ∈ A and a flow of probability measures
p ∈ M, consider the stochastic integral equation
X(t) = ξ +
∫ t
0
(
α(s) + b¯
(
s,X(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy)
))
ds
+ σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ].
(4.2)
Thanks to (H3), X is determined through Eq. (4.2) with P-probability one;
in particular, X is defined on the given stochastic basis. The minimal costs
associated with a flow of measures p and an initial distribution ν ∈ P(Rd)
with support in O are now given by
V (ν; p)
.
= inf
((Ω,F ,(Ft),P),ξ,α,W )∈A:P ◦ξ−1=ν
E
[∫ τ
0
f
(
s,X(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy), α(s)
)
ds+ F (τ,X(τ))
]
,
where X is the process determined by ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) via Eq. (4.2),
and τ
.
= τX ∧ T the random time horizon.
Remark 4.1. Since any admissible feedback strategy induces a stochas-
tic open-loop strategy, we always have
inf
u∈Ufb
J(ν, u; p) ≥ V (ν; p).
If the non-degeneracy assumption (ND) holds in addition to (H1) – (H5), if b¯
is continuous also in the time variable, and if the flow of measures p is such
that the mapping t 7→
∫
w(y)p(t, dy) is continuous, then
inf
u∈Ufb
J(ν, u; p) = V (ν; p).
This follows, for instance, from the results of El Karoui et al. [15]; see,
in particular, Proposition 2.6 and Remark 2.6.b) as well as Theorem 6.7
and Section 7 therein. Alternatively, one may use time discretization and
discrete-time dynamic programming in analogy to Lemma 4.3 in Fischer
[16].
The notion of solution we consider for the mean field game is the following:
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Definition 4.1. A feedback solution of the mean field game is a triple
(ν, u, p) such that
(i) ν ∈ P(Rd) with supp(ν) ⊂ O, u ∈ Ufb, and p ∈ M;
(ii) optimality property: strategy u is optimal for p and initial distribution
ν, that is,
J(ν, u; p) = V (ν; p);
(iii) conditional mean field property: if ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) is a solution
of Eq. (4.1) with flow of measures p, strategy u, and initial distribution
ν, then p(t) = P
(
X(t) ∈ · | τX > t
)
for every t ∈ [0, T ] such that
P
(
τX > t
)
> 0.
5. Approximate Nash equilibria from the mean field game. Through-
out this section, we assume that the non-degeneracy condition (ND) holds.
If we have a feedback solution of the mean field game that satisfies a mild
regularity condition, then we can construct a sequence of approximate Nash
equilibria for the corresponding N -player game. This approximation result
is the content of Theorem 5.1 below.
In order to state the regularity condition, we set, for ν ∈ P(Rd) with
support in O,
(5.1) Θν
.
= Law
(
(ξ + σW (t))t∈[0,T ]
)
,
whereW is a d-dimensional Wiener process and ξ an independent Rd-valued
random variable with distribution ν. Clearly, Θν is well-defined as an element
of P(X ).
The proof of Theorem 5.1 below relies on the convergence, uniqueness and
regularity results given in the Appendix. The following subsets of probabil-
ity measures will play an important role as they characterize the possible
distributions of the limit processes. For c ≥ 0, let Qν,c be the set of all laws
θ ∈ P(X ) such that θ = P ◦X−1 where
(5.2) X(t)
.
= ξ +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds + σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
W is an Rd-valued (Ft)-Wiener process defined on some filtered probability
space (Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ is an R
d-valued F0-measurable random variable with
distributionP ◦ξ−1 = ν, and v is an Rd-valued (Ft)-progressively measurable
bounded process with ‖v‖∞ ≤ c. Clearly, Qν,0 = {Θν}. Also note that Qν,c
is compact and that any measure θ ∈ Qν,c is equivalent to Θν ; see Lemmata
D.1 and D.2, respectively, in the Appendix.
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We recall that a sequence of symmetric probability measures (νN )N∈N,
with νN ∈ P(R
N ·d) for all N , is called ν-chaotic for some ν ∈ P(Rd) if,
for each k ∈ N and for any choice of bounded and continuous functions
ψi : R
d → R, i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, we have
lim
N→∞
∫
RN·d
k∏
i=1
ψi(xi) dνN (x1, . . . , xN ) =
k∏
i=1
∫
Rd
ψi(xi)ν(dxi).
Theorem 5.1. Grant (ND) in addition to (H1) – (H5). Suppose the se-
quence of initial distributions (νN )N∈N is ν-chaotic for some ν ∈ P(R
d) with
support in O. If (ν, u, p) is a feedback solution of the mean field game such
that, for Lebesgue-almost every t ∈ [0, T ],
Θν ({ϕ ∈ X : u(t, ·) is discontinuous at ϕ}) = 0,
then
uNi (t,ϕ)
.
= u(t, ϕi), t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) ∈ X
N , i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
defines a strategy vector uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) ∈ U
N
fb. Moreover, for every
ε > 0, there exists N0 = N0(ε) ∈ N such that u
N is an ε-Nash equilibrium
for the N -player game whenever N ≥ N0.
Proof. Let (ν, u, p) be a feedback solution of the mean field game ac-
cording to Definition 4.1; such a solution exists by hypothesis. For N ∈ N,
consider the strategy uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) as in the statement. By Proposi-
tion 3.1, UNfb = ×
NUN ; in particular, u
N is a feedback strategy vector in
UNfb.
Let ε > 0. By symmetry, it is enough to verify the ε-Nash property for
player one only. Thus, we have to show that there exists N0 = N0(ε) ∈ N
such that for all N ≥ N0,
(5.3) JN1 (u
N ) ≤ inf
v∈UN
JN1
(
[uN,−1, v]
)
+ ε.
Step 1. We rewrite the system dynamics and costs in such way that
we can apply the convergence, uniqueness and regularity results of the Ap-
pendix. In accordance with (3.2), the definition of b from Section 3, set, for
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(t, ϕ, θ) ∈ [0, T ] × X × P(X ),
bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)
.
= b (t, ϕ, θ, u(t, ϕ))
=

u(t, ϕ) + b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
)
if θ(τ > t) > 0,
u(t, ϕ) + b¯ (t, ϕ(t), w(0)) if θ(τ > t) = 0,
(5.4)
where τ(ϕ)
.
= inf{t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) /∈ O}. Then, thanks to hypotheses (H1) and
(H4), bˆ is Borel measurable, progressive, and bounded. Thus, the measura-
bility and boundedness assumptions (M) and (B) of the Appendix hold for
bˆ. Moreover, assumption (C) and (L) of the Appendix, the conditions of al-
most continuity and of partial Lipschitz continuity, respectively, are satisfied
for this choice of bˆ; see Section E in the Appendix.
Let ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) be a solution of Eq. (4.1) with flow of measures
p, feedback strategy u, and initial distribution ν; such a solution exists and
determines a unique measure
θ∗
.
= P ◦X−1.
Notice that θ∗ ∈ Qν,K whenever K ≥ ‖bˆ‖∞. In terms of θ∗ and the canon-
ical process Xˆ , we can rewrite the costs associated with strategy u, flow of
measures p, and initial distribution ν as
J(ν, u; p) = Eθ∗
[∫ τ
0
f
(
s, Xˆ(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy), u(s, Xˆ )
)
ds
+ F
(
τ, Xˆ(τ)
)]
,
where τ
.
= τ Xˆ ∧ T . Define fˆ : [0, T ]× X × P(X )→ R by
fˆ(t, ϕ, θ)
.
=

f
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
, u(t, ϕ)
)
if θ(τ > t) > 0,
f (t, ϕ(t), w(0), u(t, ϕ)) if θ(τ > t) = 0,
and a function Gˆ : X × P(X )→ R by
(5.5) Gˆ(ϕ, θ)
.
=
∫ τ(ϕ)∧T
0
fˆ (s, ϕ, θ) ds+ F
(
τ(ϕ) ∧ T, ϕ(τ(ϕ) ∧ T )
)
.
Then
J(ν, u; p) = Eθ∗
[
Gˆ(Xˆ, θ∗)
]
.
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The function Gˆ is bounded thanks to hypothesis (H1). Moreover, since θ∗ ∈
Qν,K for K ≥ ‖bˆ‖∞ and thanks to (H2),
Θν
(
ϕ ∈ X : ∃ (ϕn, θn) ⊂ X ×P(X ) such that Gˆ(ϕn, θn) 6→ Gˆ(ϕ, θ∗)
while (ϕn, θn)→ (ϕ, θ∗)
)
= 0,
(5.6)
To be more precise, one checks that fˆ satisfies condition (C) as does bˆ;
see Section E of the Appendix. Eq. (5.6) is then a consequence of the domi-
nated convergence theorem, the continuity of F and Part (b) of Lemma D.3.
Eq. (5.6) says that Gˆ is Θν ⊗ δθ∗ -almost surely continuous. By Lemma D.2,
any θ ∈ Qν,c, c ≥ 0, is equivalent to Θν . It follows that Gˆ is θ ⊗ δθ∗ -almost
surely continuous given any θ ∈ Qν,c, any c ≥ 0.
Recall that (ν, u, p) is a feedback solution of the mean field game. Thanks
to the conditional mean field property in Definition 4.1 and the construction
of bˆ according to (5.4), we have an alternative characterization of θ∗, namely
as a McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3); see Definition B.1 in Section B
of the Appendix. By Proposition C.1 in Section C of the Appendix and
since bˆ satisfies assumption (L) there, we actually have that θ∗ is the unique
McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3) with initial distribution ν.
Step 2. For N ∈ N, let ((ΩN ,FN , (F
N
t ),PN ),W
N ,XN ) be a solution
of Eq. (3.3) under strategy vector uN with initial distribution νN . Let µ
N
denote the associated empirical measure on the path space X . We are going
to show that
lim
N→∞
JN1 (u
N ) = J(ν, u; p).
To this end, for N ∈ N, set
b˜N (t,ϕ, θ)
.
= bˆ(t, ϕ1, θ), (t,ϕ, θ) ∈ [0, T ] ×X
N × P(X ),
where bˆ is given by (5.4). From Step 1 we know that bˆ satisfies the con-
tinuity assumptions (C) and (L) of the Appendix as well as the measur-
ability and boundedness assumptions (M) and (B), respectively. Assump-
tions (M) and (B) also apply to the coefficients b˜N . Assumptions (ND) and
(I) of the Appendix (non-degeneracy of the diffusion matrix and chaotic-
ity of the initial distributions) hold by hypothesis. Moreover, we have that
((ΩN ,FN , (F
N
t ),PN ),W
N ,XN ) is a solution of Eq. (B.1) with initial dis-
tribution νN . We can therefore apply Lemmata B.1 and B.2 to the sequence
of empirical measures (µN )N∈N; in combination with Proposition C.1, this
yields
PN ◦
(
µN
)−1 N→∞
−→ δθ∗ in P(P(X )),
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where θ∗ is the measure identified in Step 1 as the unique McKean-Vlasov
solution of Eq. (B.3) with initial distribution ν.
Symmetry of the coefficients, chaoticity of the initial distributions, and
the Tanaka-Sznitman theorem [Proposition 2.2 in 40] now imply that
(5.7) PN ◦
(
XN1 , µ
N
)−1 N→∞
−→ θ∗ ⊗ δθ∗ in P(X × P(X )),
Recalling (5.5) and since uN1 (t,ϕ) = u(t, ϕ1), we can rewrite the costs
associated with uN as
JN1 (u
N ) = EPN
[
Gˆ
(
XN1 , µ
N
)]
.
By Step 1, we know that Gˆ is bounded and, since θ∗ ∈ Qν,K for K ≥ ‖bˆ‖∞,
also that Gˆ is θ∗ ⊗ δθ∗ -almost surely continuous. By the mapping theorem
[Theorem 5.1 in 2, p. 30], convergence according to (5.7) therefore implies
that
JN1 (u
N ) = EPN
[
Gˆ
(
XN1 , µ
N
)] N→∞
−→ Eθ∗
[
Gˆ(Xˆ, θ∗)
]
= J(ν, u; p).
Step 3. For N ∈ N \ {1}, choose vN1 ∈ UN such that
JN1
(
[uN,−1, vN1 ]
)
≤ inf
v∈UN
JN1
(
[uN,−1, v]
)
+ ε/2.
Let ((Ω˜N , F˜N , (F˜
N
t ), P˜N ),W˜
N
, X˜
N
) be a solution of Eq. (3.3) under the
strategy vector [uN,−1, vN1 ] with initial distribution νN . Let µ˜
N denote the
associated empirical measure on path space. We are going to show that
lim inf
N→∞
JN1 ([u
N,−1, vN1 ]) ≥ V (ν; p).
To this end, redefine b˜N , for N ∈ N \ {1}, by
b˜N (t,ϕ, θ)
.
= b
(
t, ϕ1, θ, v
N
1 (t,ϕ)
)
, (t,ϕ, θ) ∈ [0, T ]× XN × P(X ).
Assumptions (M), (B), (ND), and (I) of the Appendix continue to hold. With
the new definition of the coefficient b˜N , ((Ω˜N , F˜N , (F˜
N
t ), P˜N ),W˜
N
, X˜
N
) is
a solution of Eq. (B.1) with initial distribution νN . As in Step 2, we can
apply Lemmata B.1 and B.2 in combination with Proposition C.1, but now
to the sequence of empirical measures (µ˜N )N∈N. This yields
(5.8) P˜N ◦
(
µ˜N
)−1 N→∞
−→ δθ∗ in P(P(X )),
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where θ∗ is still the unique McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3) with initial
distribution ν found in Steps 1 and 2.
Now, interpret the feedback controls of the first player as stochastic open-
loop relaxed controls. To this end, let R
.
= RΓ be the set of Γ-valued deter-
ministic relaxed controls over [0, T ]; see Appendix F. For N ∈ N, let ρ˜N1 be
the stochastic relaxed control induced by the feedback strategy vN1 , that is,
ρ˜N1 is the R-valued (F˜
N
t )-adapted random variable determined by
ρ˜N1,ω
(
B × I
) .
=
∫
I
δvN1 (t,X˜N1 (·,ω))
(B)dt, B ∈ B(Γ), I ∈ B([0, T ]), ω ∈ Ω˜N .
Let Arel denote the set of all quadruples ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, ρ,W ) such
that (Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a filtered probability space satisfying the usual hy-
potheses, ξ an F0-measurable random variable with values in O, ρ an R-
valued (Ft)-adapted random variable, and W a d-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener
process. Using the convergence of (µ˜N ) according to (5.8) and weak con-
vergence arguments analogous to those of Section B in the Appendix, one
verifies that the sequence
(5.9)
(
P˜N ◦
(
X˜N1 , ρ˜
N
1 , W˜
N
1 , µ˜
N
)−1)
N∈N
is tight in P(X×R×X×P(X ))
and that its limit points are concentrated on measures P ◦(X, ρ,W )−1⊗ δθ∗
where ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, ρ,W ) ∈ Arel for some F0-measurable R
d-valued
random variable ξ with P ◦ξ−1 = ν, and X is a continuous (Ft)-adapted
process satisfying
X(t) = ξ +
∫
Γ×[0,t]
γ ρ(dγ, ds) +
∫ t
0
b¯
(
s,X(s),
∫
Rd
w(y)p(s, dy)
)
ds
+ σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
(5.10)
with flow of measures p given by
p(t)
.
= θ∗
(
Xˆ(t) ∈ · | τ Xˆ > t
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Notice thatX is uniquely determined (with P-probability one) by Eq. (5.10).
The stochastic relaxed control in (5.10) actually corresponds to an ordinary
stochastic open-loop control, namely to the Γ-valued process
(5.11) α(t, ω)
.
=
∫
Γ
γρ˙s,ω(dγ), (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ] × Ω.
The process X is therefore the unique solution of Eq. (4.2) corresponding
to ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) ∈ A and the flow of measures p induced by θ∗.
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In analogy with Step 1, define f¯ : [0, T ]× X × P(X )× Γ→ R by
f¯(t, ϕ, θ, γ)
.
=

f
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
, γ
)
if θ(τ > t) > 0,
f (t, ϕ(t), w(0), u(t, ϕ)) if θ(τ > t) = 0,
and a function G¯ : X × P(X ) ×R → R by
G¯(ϕ, θ, r)
.
=
∫
Γ×[0,T ]
1[0,τ(ϕ)∧T )(s) · f¯ (s, ϕ, θ, γ) r(dγ, ds)
+F
(
τ(ϕ) ∧ T, ϕ(τ(ϕ) ∧ T )
)
.
(5.12)
Then
JN1 ([u
N,−1, vN1 ]) = EP˜N
[
G¯
(
X˜N1 , µ˜
N , ρ˜N1
)]
.
The function G¯ is bounded thanks to hypothesis (H1). By (H2) and argu-
ments analogous to those of Step 1, one checks that
Θν
(
ϕ ∈ X : ∃ r ∈ R, (ϕn, θn, rn) ⊂ X ×P(X ) ×R such that
Gˆ(ϕn, θn, rn) 6→ Gˆ(ϕ, θ∗, r) while (ϕn, θn, rn)→ (ϕ, θ∗, r)
)
= 0,
(5.13)
By Lemma D.2, any θ ∈ Qν,c, c ≥ 0, is equivalent to Θν . In view of (5.13), it
follows that G¯ is Q-almost surely continuous given any Q ∈ P(X×P(X )×R)
such thatQ◦pi−1X×P(X ) = θ⊗δθ∗ for some θ ∈ Qν,c, some c ≥ 0, where piX×P(X )
denotes the projection of X ×P(X )×R onto its first two components. Using
the mapping theorem of weak convergence, we conclude that
lim inf
N→∞
JN1 ([u
N,−1, vN1 ]) ≥ inf
((Ω,F ,(Ft),P),ξ,ρ,W )∈Arel:P ◦ξ−1=ν
E
[
G¯ (X, θ∗, ρ)
]
.
It remains to check that
inf
((Ω,F ,(Ft),P),ξ,ρ,W )∈Arel:P◦ξ−1=ν
E
[
G¯ (X, θ∗, ρ)
]
= V (ν; p).
Inequality “≥” holds by definition of G¯ and becauseA ⊆ Arel if one identifies
ordinary stochastic open-loop controls with the induced stochastic relaxed
controls. The opposite inequality is a consequence of what is called “chat-
tering lemma”, i.e., the fact that relaxed controls can be approximated by
ordinary controls; see, for instance, Theorem 3.5.2 in Kushner [28, p. 59] or
Section 4 in El Karoui et al. [15]. In our situation, the stochastic relaxed con-
trol in Eq. (5.10) corresponds to an ordinary stochastic open-loop control. If
the running costs f are additive convex in the control, then inequality “≤”
can be verified more directly by using (5.11) and Jensen’s inequality.
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Step 4. For every N ∈ N \ {1},
JN1 (u
N )− inf
v∈UN
JN1 ([u
N,−1, v])
≤ JN1 (u
N )− J(ν, u; p) + J(ν, u; p) − JN1 ([u
N,−1, vN1 ]) + ε/2.
By Steps 2 and 3, there exists N0 = N0(ε) such that for all N ≥ N0,
JN1 (u
N )− J(ν, u; p) + V (ν; p)− JN1 ([u
N,−1, vN1 ]) ≤ ε/2.
Since (ν, u; p) is a solution of the mean field game, J(ν, u; p) = V (ν; p). It
follows that for all N ≥ N0,
JN1 (u
N )− inf
v∈UN
JN1 ([u
N,−1, v]) ≤ ε,
which establishes (5.3).
6. Existence of solutions. Throughout this section, hypotheses (H1) –
(H5) as well as (ND) are in force. Under these and some additional assump-
tions, we show that, given any initial distribution, a feedback solution of
the mean field game exists in the sense of Definition 4.1; see Theorem 6.2
in Subsection 6.2. To prove Theorem 6.2, we use a BSDE to approach to
the control problem for fixed flow of measures (Subsection 6.1) and a fixed
point argument, both in the spirit of Carmona and Lacker [7].
In Subsection 6.3, we provide conditions that guarantee the existence
of a feedback solution to the mean field game with continuous Markovian
feedback strategy; see Corollary 6.3. Such a solution satisfies, in particular,
the requirements of Theorem 5.1.
As above, let ν ∈ P(Rd) with support in O denote the initial distribution.
Since ν will be fixed, the dependence on ν will often be omitted in the
notation.
6.1. Optimal controls for a given flow of measures. Let p ∈ M be a given
flow of measures, and define the corresponding flow mp of means by
(6.1) mp(t)
.
=
∫
Rd
w(y)p(t, dy), t ∈ [0, T ].
Recall that Xˆ denotes the canonical process on the path space X
.
=
C([0, T ];Rd) (equipped with the sup-norm topology). Also recall (5.1), the
definition of Θν . Set Ω
.
= X , X
.
= Xˆ , let F be the Θν-completion of the
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Borel σ-algebra B(X ), and set P
.
= Θν (extended to all null sets). Let (Ft)
be the P-augmentation of the filtration generated by X. Lastly, set
ξ(ω)
.
= X(0, ω), W (t, ω)
.
= σ−1 (X(t, ω)− ξ(ω)) , (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]× Ω,
which is well-defined thanks to (ND). Then (Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a filtered prob-
ability space satisfying the usual assumptions, W a d-dimensional (Ft)-
Wiener process, and ξ an F0-measurable random variable with law ν in-
dependent of W . Moreover, by construction,
(6.2) X(t) = ξ + σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
and P ◦X−1 = Θν .
Let U denote the set of all Γ-valued (Ft)-progressively measurable pro-
cesses. The filtration (Ft) is the P-augmentation of the filtration generated
by X. Any feedback strategy u ∈ Ufb therefore induces an element of U
through ut
.
= u(t,X), t ∈ [0, T ]. On the other hand, given u ∈ U , we can
find a progressive functional u ∈ U1 such that u(·,X) = u· LebT ⊗P-almost
surely, where LebT denotes Lebesgue measure on [0, T ]. Lastly, by Proposi-
tion 4.1 and (ND), Ufb = U1. We can therefore identify elements of U with
those of Ufb, and vice versa.
Let u ∈ U . By Girsanov’s theorem and the boundedness of b¯, there exists
a probability measure Pp,u ∼ P and a Pp,u-Wiener process W p,u such that
dX(t) =
(
ut + b¯ (t,X(t),mp(t))
)
dt+ σdW p,u(t).
The costs associated with u are then given by
Jp(u)
.
= Ep,u
[∫ τ
0
f (t,X(t),mp(t),ut) dt+ F (τ,Xτ )
]
.
If u ∈ Ufb = U1 is such that u(·,X) = u· LebT ⊗P-almost surely, then (cf.
Section 4)
Jp(u) = J(ν, u; p).
Since elements of U can be identified with those of Ufb, and vice versa, we
have
V p
.
= inf
u∈U
Jp(u) = inf
u∈Ufb
J(ν, u; p).
In view of Remark 4.1, if p is such that t 7→ mp(t) is continuous, then
V p = V (ν; p).
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Define the Hamiltonian h and the minimized Hamiltonian H as follows
h(t, x,m, z, γ)
.
= f(t, x,m, γ) + z · σ−1b(t, x,m, γ),
H(t, x,m, z)
.
= inf
γ∈Γ
h(t, x,m, z, γ),
where b(t, x,m, γ)
.
= γ+ b¯(t, x,m). The set in which the infimum is attained
is denoted by
A(t, x,m, z)
.
= {γ ∈ Γ : h(t, x,m, z, γ) = H(t, x,m, z)} .
This set is nonempty since Γ is compact and the function h is continuous in
γ thanks to (H4) and (H2), respectively.
Now, consider the following BSDE with random terminal date τ
.
= τX∧T :
Y p(t) = F (τ,X(τ)) +
∫ T
t
H (s,X(s),mp(s), Z
p(s)) 1(s<τ)ds
−
∫ T
t
Zp(s)dW (s),
(6.3)
where X follows the forward dynamics (6.2) and W is a Wiener process
under P as before. As in [12], we adopt the convention that for any solution
to the BSDE above:
1(s>τ)Y (s) = F (τ,X(τ)), 1(s>τ)Z(s) = 0, 1(s>τ)H(s, x,m, z) = 0.
Observe that since the driver is Lipschitz in z and does not depend on
y, assumptions (4), (5), (7) and (21) in [12] are satisfied. Moreover, their
assumption (25) is also fulfilled due to the fact that the terminal time τ , the
terminal value F , the drift b¯ and the running cost f are all bounded; cf. (H1).
Hence Theorem 3.4 of Darling and Pardoux [12] applies, yielding that the
BSDE (6.3) has a unique solution (Y p, Zp) in the space of all progressively
measurable processes K
.
= (Y,Z) with values in Rd × Rd×d such that
E
[∫ τ∧T
0
|K(t)|2dt
]
<∞.
For each u ∈ U we can proceed in a similar way to get existence and unique-
ness (in the same space of processes as above) of the solution (Y p,u, Zp,u) to
the following BSDE
Y p,u(t) = F (τ,X(τ)) +
∫ T
t
h (s,X(s),mp(s), Z
p,u(s),us)1(s<τ)ds
−
∫ T
t
Zp,u(s)dW (s).
(6.4)
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Changing measure from P to Pp,u we obtain
Y p,u(t) = F (τ,X(τ)) +
∫ T
t
f (s,X(s),mp(s),us)1(s<τ)ds
−
∫ T
t
Zp,u(s)dW p,u(s).
Hence, taking conditional expectation with respect to Pp,u and Ft on both
sides, we have
Y p,u(t) = Ep,u
[
F (τ,X(τ)) +
∫ T
t
f (s,X(s),mp(s),us) 1(s<τ)ds | Ft
]
,
which implies E[Y p,u(0)] = Ep,u[Y p,u(0)] = Jp(u). The first equality is due
to the fact that the law of ξ is the same under both probability measures.
SinceH ≤ h and the forward state variable X is the same for both BSDEs
(6.3) and (6.4) (so that they both have the same random terminal time),
we can apply Darling and Pardoux [12, Corollary 4.4.2] yielding Y pt ≤ Y
p,u
t
a.s. for all t ∈ [0, T ]. This implies that E[Y p(0)] ≤ E[Y p,u(0)] = Jp(u) for all
u ∈ U , and therefore E[Y p(0)] ≤ V p.
By a standard measurable selection argument, there exists a measurable
function uˆ : [0, T ]× Rd ×Rd0 × Rd×d → Γ such that
uˆ(t, x,m, z) ∈ A(t, x,m, z) for all (t, x,m, z).
Hence, letting
(6.5) upt
.
= uˆ (t,X(t),mp(t), Z
p(t)) ,
the uniqueness of the solution of BSDEs with random terminal time as in
Darling and Pardoux [12, Theorem 3.4] gives Y p(t) = Y p,u
p
(t), which in turn
implies V p = Jp(up).
6.2. Existence of solutions of the mean field game. We are going to apply
the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem [for instance, 1, 17.56
Corollary], which we recall for the reader’s convenience:
Theorem 6.1 (Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff). Let K be a nonempty com-
pact convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorff space, and let Ψ : K → K
be a continuous function. Then the set of fixed points of Ψ is compact and
nonempty.
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We need to identify a suitable space K and a good function Ψ in order to
apply the fixed theorem above to our setting and obtain the existence of a
solution to the mean field game.
In addition to (H1) – (H5) and (ND), let us make the following assump-
tions:
Assumptions 6.1.
(i) The coefficients b¯ and f are continuous (jointly in all their variables).
(ii) The set A(t, x,m, z) is a singleton for all (t, x,m, z) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd ×
R
d0 ×Rd×d.
By Assumption 6.1(ii), the function uˆ appearing in (6.5) is uniquely de-
termined. Moreover, uˆ is continuous:
Lemma 6.1. The function uˆ is continuous (jointly in all its variables).
Proof. Assumption 6.1(i) implies that the (pre-)Hamiltonian h is (jointly)
continuous. The continuity of uˆ now follows from Berge’s Maximum Theorem
[for instance, 1, Theorem 17.31], Assumption 6.1(ii) and the compactness of
Γ according to (H4).
We will apply the fixed point theorem to a restriction of the mapping
(6.6) Ψ: P(X ) ∋ µ 7→ Pµ ◦X−1 ∈ P(X )
where Pµ
.
= Pp
µ,uˆµ according to Subsection 6.1 with pµ and uˆµ defined as
follows:
pµ(t, ·)
.
= µ
(
X(t) ∈ · | τX > t
)
,(6.7a)
uˆµt
.
= up
µ
t = uˆ
(
t,X(t),
∫
w(y)pµ(t, dy), Zp
µ
(t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].(6.7b)
Thanks to Assumption 6.1(ii), the optimal control process uˆµ is unique
LebT ⊗P-almost surely. Let Eµ denote expectation with respect to µ (not
Pµ!).
Now, we need to specify the subspace of P(X ) with the right properties
for applying the fixed point theorem. Recall the definition of Qν,c with c ≥ 0
from Section 5. Choose K > 0 such that K ≥ ‖b‖∞, and set
K
.
= Qν,K .
Then K is non-empty and convex, and it is compact with respect to the
topology inherited from P(X ) (i.e., the topology of weak convergence of
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measures), see Lemma D.1 in the Appendix. Moreover, K can be seen as a
subset of the dual space Cb(X )
∗, where Cb(X ) is the space of all continuous
bounded functions on X . The dual space Cb(X )
∗, equipped with the weak*
topology σ(Cb(X )
∗,Cb(X )), is a locally convex topological vector space,
inducing the weak convergence on P(X ) ⊃ K.
If µ ∈ K, then the flow of conditional means induced by µ is continuous:
Lemma 6.2. Let µ ∈ K. Then the mapping t 7→ mµ(t)
.
=
∫
w(y)pµ(t, dy)
is continuous, where pµ is the flow of conditional measures induced by µ
according to (6.7a).
Proof. By Lemma D.2, inft∈[0,T ] µ(τ
X > t) > 0. Therefore and by con-
struction, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
mµ(t) =
1
µ(τX > t)
Eµ
[
w(X(t))1[0,τX )(t)
]
.
Let t ∈ [0, T ], and let (tn) ⊂ [0, T ] be such that tn → t as n → ∞. For
ω ∈ Ω, the mapping s 7→ 1[0,τX(ω))(s) is discontinuous only at s = τ
X(ω). By
part (c) of Lemma D.3, µ
(
τX = t
)
= 0. Since w is bounded and continuous
and X has continuous trajectories, we have with µ-probability one,
1[0,τX)(tn)
n→∞
−→ 1[0,τX)(t), w (X(tn)) 1[0,τX)(tn)
n→∞
−→ w (X(t)) 1[0,τX)(t).
The dominated convergence theorem now implies limn→∞m(tn) = m(t).
In order to apply Theorem 6.1 above, we have to show that Ψ: K → K is
(sequentially) continuous. Let (µn) be a sequence in K converging to some
measure µ ≡ µ∞ ∈ K. We want to show that Ψ(µn) → Ψ(µ) in K ⊂ P(X ).
To ease the notation, we set
pn
.
= pµ
n
, Zn
.
= Zp
n
, unt
.
= up
n
t , 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞.
We proceed as in Carmona and Lacker [7, Proof of Theorem 3.5] and show
that
(6.8) H(Pµ | Pµ
n
)
n→∞
−→ 0,
where H(· | ·) denotes the relative entropy:
H(µ˜ | µ¯)
.
=
{∫
log
(
dµ˜
dµ¯
)
dµ˜ if µ˜ absolutely continuous w.r.t. µ¯
∞ otherwise.
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Observe that (6.8) implies Ψ(µn) → Ψ(µ) in the topology of weak conver-
gence as well as in the topology of convergence in total variation.
In our situation, denoting by E(·) the stochastic exponential of a local
martingale, we have
dPµ
n
dPµ
= E
(∫ ·
0
σ−1 (b(t,X(t),mn(t),unt )− b(t,X(t),m
∞(t),u∞t )) 1[0,τX)(t)
dW p
∞
(t)
)
(T ),
where mn denotes the flow of means induced by pn according to (6.1):
mn(t)
.
=
∫
w(y)pn(t, dy), 1 ≤ n ≤ ∞.
Since σ−1b is bounded, we obtain
H(Pµ | Pµ
n
) = −EP
µ
[
log
dPµ
n
dPµ
]
=
1
2
EP
µ
[∫ τ
0
∣∣σ−1b (t,X(t),mn(t),unt )− σ−1b (t,X(t),m∞(t),u∞t )∣∣2 dt
]
.
By (H2), the map b(t, x, ·, ·) is continuous for all (t, x). Hence, we can con-
clude by an application of the bounded convergence theorem provided we
show that
(6.9) (mn,un)
n→∞
−→ (m∞,u∞) in LebT ⊗P
µ-measure.
First, we show that
(6.10) mn
n→∞
−→ m∞ in LebT -measure.
By Lemma D.2, infn∈N∪{∞} inft∈[0,T ] µ
n
(
τX > t
)
> 0. Hence, by construc-
tion, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
mn(t) =
1
µn(τX > t)
Eµn
[
w(X(t))1[0,τX )(t)
]
, n ∈ N.
The mapping 1[0,τX)(t) is µ-almost surely continuous for each fixed t by
part (d) of Lemma D.3. By hypothesis, w is bounded and continuous. The
mapping theorem [Theorem 5.1 in 2, p. 30] therefore implies that
Eµn
[
w(X(t))1[0,τX )(t)
]
→ Eµ
[
w(X(t))1[0,τX )(t)
]
,
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as well as µn(τX > t)→ µ(τX > t). This gives that mn(t)→ m∞(t) for all
t, hence mn → m∞ pointwise and in LebT -measure.
Next, let us check that
(6.11) lim
n→∞
E
[∫ T
0
|Zn(t)− Z∞(t)|2 dt
]
= 0.
To this end, we use a stability result for BSDEs with random terminal time
as in Briand and Hu [4, Theorem 2.4]. According to that result, in order to
get the convergence (6.11), it suffices to show that
E
[∫ τ
0
|H(s,X(s),mn(s), Z∞(s))−H(s,X(s),m∞(s), Z∞(s))|2ds
]
n→∞
−→ 0.
Since the functions f and b in the definition of the minimized Hamiltonian
H are bounded and the controls take values in a compact set, we easily have
|H(s,X(s),mn(s), Z∞(s))−H(s,X(s),m∞(s), Z∞(s))|2 ≤ c1+c2|Z
∞(s)|2,
where c1, c2 are some positive constants. Moreover, E[
∫ τ
0 |Z
∞(t)|2dt] < ∞
(cf. Darling and Pardoux [12, Theorem 3.4]). We can therefore apply the
dominated convergence theorem to obtain (6.11). The convergence in LebT×
Pµ-measure follows from the equivalence Pµ ∼ P.
In view of (6.10), in order to establish (6.9), it remains to show that
unt → u
∞
t P
µ-almost surely for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Notice that for all n ∈ N∪{∞}
uˆnt = uˆ (t,X(t),m
n(t), Zn(t)) .
By Lemma 6.1, uˆ is jointly continuous in all its variables. Equations (6.10)
and (6.11) together imply that (mn, Zn)→ (m∞, Z∞) in LebT×P
µ-measure.
It follows that uˆn → uˆ∞ in LebT ×P
µ-measure as well.
Now, we can state and prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 6.2. Under (H1) – (H5), (ND), and Assumptions 6.1, there
exists a feedback solution of the mean field game.
Proof. In view of the discussion above, we can apply Theorem 6.1 (the
Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoff fixed point theorem) to the map Ψ : K → K.
Thus, there exists µ ∈ K such that Ψ(µ) = µ. Let p
.
= pµ be the flow of
conditional measures induced by the fixed point µ according to (6.7a). Let
mp be the flow of (conditional) means induced by p according to (6.1), and
let (Y p, Zp) be the unique solution of the BSDE (6.3). Notice that Zp is
progressively measurable with respect to (Ft), the P-augmentation of the
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filtration generated by the canonical process X = Xˆ . Hence we can find
u ∈ U1 such that
u(·,X) = uˆ (·,X(·),mp(·), Z
p(·)) LebT ⊗P-almost surely.
Recalling the discussion of Subsection 6.1 and the fact that in our situation
U1 = Ufb, we see that
J(ν, u; p) = V p.
The flow of means mp is continuous thanks to Lemma 6.2. This implies,
by Remark 4.1, that V p = V (ν; p). The triple (ν, u, p) therefore satisfies
the optimality property of Definition 4.1. By construction of Ψ and the
fixed point property of µ, (ν, u, p) also satisfies the conditional mean field
property of Definition 4.1. It follows that (ν, u, p) is a feedback solution of
the mean field game.
6.3. Continuity of optimal controls. Here, we work under all the hy-
potheses of the previous subsections plus a couple of additional assumptions
to be introduced below. Let p ∈ M be a flow of measures such that the in-
duced flow of means mp is continuous, that is, we assume that the mapping
t 7→ mp(t)
.
=
∫
Rd
w(y)p(t, dy)
is continuous. From Lemma 6.2 we know that this is the case if p is the flow
of measures induced by some µ ∈ K.
The aim here is to show that uˆ(·,X(·),mp(·), Z
p(·)), the optimal con-
trol process appearing in (6.5), corresponds to a Markovian feedback strat-
egy that is continuous both in its time and its state variable. In view of
Lemma 6.1 and the continuity of mp, it suffices to show that Z
p(t) can be
expressed as a continuous function of time t and the forward state variable
X(t).
Set, for (t, x, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Rd×d,
h˜(t, x, z)
.
= h(t, x,m(t), z, uˆ(t, x,mp(t), z)).
Notice that h˜(t, x, z) = H(t, x,mp(t), z). Moreover, by Assumptions 6.1,
Lemma 6.1, and the continuity of mp, we have that h˜ is continuous (jointly
in all its variables). By (H1) and (H4), h˜(·, ·, z) is bounded for each z ∈ Rd×d.
Consider the following BSDE under P:
(6.12) Y (t) = F (τ,X(τ))+
∫ T
t
h˜ (s,X(s), Z(s)) 1(s<τ)ds−
∫ T
t
Z(s)dW (s),
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with the same convention regarding times exceeding τ as in Subsection 6.1.
The BSDE above possesses a unique L2-solution (Y,Z), which coincides
with the unique solution (Y p, Zp) of the BSDE (6.3). To prove the continu-
ity property, we adopt the following procedure: first, we consider the PDE
corresponding to the BSDE (6.12) and prove some regularity implying, in
particular, the continuity of the gradient of the solution; second, we provide
a verification argument essentially identifying the solution of the PDE and
its gradient with the unique solution (Y,Z) of (6.12). This is performed in
the proof of the next proposition. Before that, we have to introduce some
notation on Sobolev and Ho¨lder-type norms.
Set D
.
= [0, T ) × O, and let ∂pD
.
= ([0, T ) × ∂O) ∪ ({T} × O¯) be the
parabolic boundary of D. Moreover, let A denote the (parabolic) Dynkin
operator associated with X under P, that is,
A
.
= ∂t +
1
2
Tr(a∂2xx),
where a
.
= σσT. Let Lλ(D) denote the space of λ-th power integrable func-
tions on D, with ‖ · ‖λ,D norm in L
λ(D). For 1 < λ < ∞, let Hλ(D)
denote the space of functions ψ that together with their generalized partial
derivatives ∂tψ, ∂xiψ, ∂xixjψ, i, j = 1, . . . , n, are in L
λ(D). In Hλ(D) let us
introduce the norm (of Sobolev type)
(6.13) ‖ψ‖
(2)
λ,D
.
= ‖ψ‖λ,D + ‖∂tψ‖λ,D +
d∑
i=1
‖∂xiψ‖λ,D +
d∑
i,j=1
‖∂xixjψ‖λ,D.
Let us also consider Ho¨lder-type norms as follows. For 0 < α ≤ 1, let
‖ψ‖D
.
= sup
(t,x)∈D
|ψ(t, x)|,
|ψ|αD
.
= ‖ψ‖D + sup
x,y∈O¯,t∈[0,T ]
|ψ(t, x) − ψ(t, y)|
|x− y|α
+ sup
s,t∈[0,T ],x∈O¯
|ψ(s, x) − ψ(t, x)|
|s− t|α/2
.
Finally, we let
|ψ|1+αD
.
= |ψ|αD +
d∑
i=1
|∂xiψ|
α
D.
Assumptions 6.2.
(i) b¯, f belong to C0,1([0, T ]× (O¯×Rd0)) and C0,1([0, T ]× (O¯×Rd0×Γ)),
respectively. Thus, b ∈ C0,1([0, T ] × (O¯ × Rd0 × Γ)).
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(ii) F (T, ·) ∈ C2(O¯) and F (t, x) = F˜ (t, x) for all t ∈ [0, T ] and x ∈ ∂O,
where F˜ ∈ C1,2(D¯). Moreover, for some λ > d+22 ,
‖F‖
(2)
λ,∂pD
<∞.
Assumption 6.2(ii) on the terminal costs F corresponds to assumption
(E7) in Fleming and Rishel [17, Appendix E].
Proposition 6.1. Grant (H1) – (H5), (ND) as well as Assumptions 6.1
and 6.2. The optimal control is then given by
upt = uˆ(t,X(t),mp(t), ∂xϕ(t,X(t))σ), t ∈ [0, τ ],
where the function ϕ is the unique solution in Hλ(D) of the Cauchy problem
−Aϕ− h˜(·, ϕ, ∂xϕσ) = 0 on D, ϕ = F on ∂pO,(6.14)
and it satisfies
(6.15) ‖ϕ‖
(2)
λ,D ≤M
(
‖f‖λ,D + ‖F‖
(2)
λ,∂pD
)
,
with constant M depending only on bounds on b and σ on D. Moreover,
(6.16) |ϕ|1+αD ≤M
′‖ϕ‖
(2)
λ,D, α = 1−
d+ 2
λ
,
for some constant M ′ depending on D and λ.
As a consequence, the function (t, x) 7→ uˆ(t, x,m(t), ∂xϕ(t, x)σ) is contin-
uous over [0, T ]× O¯.
Proof. First, consider the Cauchy problem (6.14). The existence and
uniqueness of a solution in Hλ(D) satisfying the estimate (6.15) can be
found in Fleming and Rishel [17, Appendix E, Proof of Theorem VI.6.1,
pp. 208-209]. Observe that our assumptions together with the continuity of
h˜ imply the hypotheses (6.1)–(6.3) in Fleming and Rishel [17, p. 167], with
the exception of (6.3)(b). In fact, in our setting the drift b and the running
cost f are only continuous in t and not necessarily C1; cf. Assumption 6.2(i).
However, a careful inspection of the proof by Fleming and Rishel shows that
we can apply their approximation argument excluding the last sentence.
Hence, there exists a non-increasing sequence (ϕn) converging pointwise to
the unique solution ϕ ∈ Hλ(D) of the Cauchy problem (6.14). Moreover,
each ϕn satisfies the inequality (6.15). Using Ladyz˘enskaja et al. [30, p. 80,
p. 342], the estimate (6.15) gives (6.16) if λ > d + 2, and in this case α =
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1− d+2λ where the constant M
′ depends on D and λ. Notice that the upper
bounds in (6.15) and (6.16) are both uniform in n. Therefore, letting n→∞,
we have that the solution ϕ satisfies the same bounds. In particular, (6.16)
yields that the gradient ∂xϕ is well-defined in the classical sense and it is
continuous on D.
To complete the proof, it suffices to show that the pair of processes
(ϕ(t,X(t)), ∂xϕ(t,X(t))σ)t∈[0,τ ] coincides with the unique L
2 solution of the
BSDE (6.12). We use a verification argument based on a generalization of
Itoˆ’s formula as in Krylov [27, Theorem 1, Sect. 2.10]. Applying that formula
between t and τ , on the random set {t ≤ τ}, we have with P-probability
one
ϕ(τ,X(τ)) = ϕ(t,X(t)) +
∫ τ
t
Aϕ(s,X(s))ds
+
∫ τ
t
∂xϕ(s,X(s))σdW (s).
Being ϕ a solution in Hλ(D) of the Cauchy problem (6.14), we have (by
re-arranging the terms)
ϕ(t,X(t)) = F (τ,X(τ)) −
∫ τ
t
h˜(s,X(s), ∂xϕ(s,X(s))σ)ds
−
∫ τ
t
∂xϕ(s,X(s))σdW (s),
which gives, by uniqueness of the solution (Y,Z) of the BSDE (6.12), that
Y (t) = ϕ(t,X(t)), Z(t) = ∂xϕ(t,X(t))σ,
on the event {t ≤ τ} for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proposition 6.1 and Theorem 6.2 yield (together with Lemma 6.2) the
following corollary. Observe that the control actions can be chosen in an
arbitrary way when the state process is outside cl(O).
Corollary 6.3. Grant (H1) – (H5), (ND) as well as Assumptions 6.1
and 6.2. Then there exist a feedback solution of the mean field game (ν, u, p)
and a continuous function u˜ : [0, T ]× Rd → Γ such that
u(t, ϕ) = u˜(t, ϕ(t)) for all (t, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ] × X .
In particular, u is continuous on [0, T ]× X .
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We end this section by sketching the PDE approach to mean field games
with absorption. For simplicity, we only consider a setting analogous to that
of Lasry and Lions [33], where the dynamics are of calculus-of-variation-type
with additive noise and the running costs split into two parts, one depending
on the control, the other on the measure variable. Thus, we assume that
σ ≡ σ Idd, b¯(t, x, y) ≡ 0, f(t, x, y, γ) = f0(t, x, γ) + f1(t, x, y)
for some scalar constant σ > 0 and suitable functions f0 : [0, T ]×R
d×Γ→ R
and f1 : [0, T ]×R
d×Rd0 → R. Let us also assume that the initial distribution
ν is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with density
m0.
Let (ν, u, p) be a solution according to Corollary 6.3, and let u˜ be the
associated Markov feedback strategy.
Set H(t, x, z)
.
= maxγ∈Γ {−γ · z − f0(t, x, γ)}. Let V be the unique solu-
tion of the Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation
(6.17)
− ∂tV −
σ2
2
∆V +H(t, x,∇V ) = f1
(
t, x,
∫
w(y)p(t, dy)
)
in [0, T ) ×O
with boundary condition V (t, x) = F (t, x) in {T}× cl(O)∪ [0, T )× ∂O, and
let m be the unique solution of the Kolmogorov forward equation
(6.18) ∂tm−
σ2
2
∆m+ div (m(t, x) · u˜(t, x)) = 0 in (0, T ]×O
with initial condition m(0, x) = m0(x) and boundary condition m(t, x) = 0
in (0, T ] × ∂O. Then
u˜(t, x) = −DzH (t, x,∇V (t, x)) , p(t, dx) =
m(t, x)∫
Om(t, y)dy
dx.(6.19)
A non-standard feature in (6.19) is the renormalization by the factor
1/
∫
Om(t, y)dy. This is related to the fact that m(t, ·) will be the density
of a sub-probability measure, not necessarily a probability measure if t >
0. Relationship (6.19) clearly allows to eliminate the measure flow p from
Eq. (6.17) and the feedback control u˜ from Eq. (6.18), yielding a coupled
system of (backward) Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman equation and Kolmogorov
forward equation. This gives the PDE system for the mean field game with
absorption.
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7. A counterexample. If the diffusion coefficient is degenerate and
no additional controllability assumptions are made, then a regular feedback
solution of the mean field game need not induce a sequence of approximate
Nash equilibria with vanishing error.
The following (counter-)example is constructed in such a way that, for
a certain initial condition, the individual state processes of the N -player
games cannot leave the set O of non-absorbing states before terminal time,
while this is possible in the mean field game limit. Exit before terminal time
can actually occur only at one fixed instant, if at all. With the choice of the
costs we make, leaving before terminal time is preferable. The individual
strategies that the solution of the mean field game induces in the N -player
games will therefore push the state processes towards the boundary if they
start from certain initial points, but will fail to make them exit (for N odd,
the probability of exit equals zero, for N even it will tend to zero as N →∞).
The failure to leave the set O in the N -player games will produce costs that
are higher than those of an alternative individual response strategy which
does not try to make its state process exit.
To achieve the described effect, we choose deterministic state dynamics;
the only source of randomness comes from the initial conditions. Individual
states will have three components, where one component (the third) cor-
responds to time, while the second component simply keeps its own initial
condition. Only the first component is controlled; its evolution is driven,
apart from the control, by an average over the second component of the
states of all players (a mean with respect to the measure variable in the
limit). That interaction term is responsible for the different controllability
of the N -player systems with respect to the limit system. Notice that the
construction also relies on the particular choice of the initial conditions,
which are singular with respect to Lebesgue measure. To be specific, con-
sider the following data for our systems:
• dimensions: d = 3, d0 = 1;
• time horizon: T = 2;
• set of control actions: Γ
.
=
{
γ ∈ R3 : γ1 ∈ [−1, 1], γ2 = 0 = γ3
}
;
• set of non-absorbing states
O
.
=
{
x ∈ R3 :− 4 < x1 , −2 < x2 < 2 , −1 < x3 <
11
5
,
x1 < 1 + e
x3−1
}
• measure integrand: w bounded Lipschitz and such that w(x) = x2 for
all x ∈ cl(O);
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• drift function:
b¯(t, x, y)
.
=

−|y| ∧ 140
1

 , (t, x, y) ∈ [0, 2] ×R3 × R;
• dispersion coefficient: σ ≡ 0;
• running costs: f ≡ 1;
• terminal costs: F non-negative bounded Lipschitz and such that
F (t, x) = 1 +
x3
12
· x1 for all (t, x) ∈ [0, 2] × cl(O).
Remark 7.1. The set of non-absorbing states O defined above has a
boundary that is only piecewise smooth. Let B ⊂ R3 be the line segment
given by
B
.
=
{
x ∈ R3 : x1 = 2 , −1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 , x3 = 1
}
.
As will become clear below, the (counter-)example works for any bounded
open set O as long as O contains{
x ∈ R3 : −1 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 , 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 2 , −1−
5
4
x3 ≤ x1 ≤ 1 + x3
}
\B,
while B ∩ O = ∅ (hence B ⊂ ∂O). There are bounded open sets with this
property and smooth (C2 or even C∞) boundary.
Let ρ denote the Rademacher distribution on B(R), that is, supp(ρ) =
{−1, 1} and ρ({−1}) = 1/2 = ρ({1}). Define a probability measure ν on
B(R3) by
ν
.
= ρ⊗ ρ⊗ δ0,
and choose, for N ∈ N, the initial distribution for the N -player game ac-
cording to νN
.
= ⊗Nν.
The dynamics of the N -player game are thus given by
XNi,1(t)XNi,2(t)
XNi,3(t)

 =

XNi,1(0)XNi,2(0)
0


+
∫ t
0

ui,1(s,X
N )−
∣∣∣ 1N¯N (s) ∑Nj=1 1[0,τNj )(s) ·XNj,2(s)
∣∣∣ ∧ 14
0
1

 ds,
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where XNi,k(0), k ∈ {1, 2}, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, are i.i.d. Rademacher and u =
(u1, . . . , uN ) ∈ U
N
fb is an admissible strategy vector. Clearly, for all s ∈ [0, 2],
1
N¯N (s)
N∑
j=1
1[0,τNj )
(s) ·XNj,2(s) =
1
N¯N (s)
N∑
j=1
1[0,τNj )
(s) ·XNj,2(0).
Randomness thus enters the system only through the initial condition. We
may therefore fix the stochastic basis. To this end, let ξNi,k, k ∈ {1, 2},
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, be i.i.d. Rademacher random variables defined on some
probability space (ΩN ,F
N ,PN ). As filtration, we may take any filtration
that makes the ξNi,k measurable at time zero. The dynamics of the N -player
system can be rewritten as

XNi,1(t)XNi,2(t)
XNi,3(t)

 =


ξNi,1 +
∫ t
0

ui,1(s,XN )− ∣∣∣ 1N¯N (s)
N∑
j=1
1[0,τNj )
(s) · ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4

 ds
ξNi,2
t


Since ui,1 takes values in [−1, 1] and ξ
N
i,1 values in {−1, 1}, we have, for
PN -almost all ω ∈ ΩN ,
(7.1) − 1−
5
4
t ≤ XNi,1(t, ω) ≤ 1 + t for all t ∈ [0, 2].
By construction of O, XNi (·, ω) can leave O before the terminal time only if
XNi,1(1, ω) = 2; this is possible only if
∑N
j=1 ξ
N
j,2(ω) = 0. But
PN

 N∑
j=1
ξNj,2(ω) = 0

 =
{
0 if N is odd,( N
N/2
)
1
2N
if N is even.
Since
( N
N/2
)
1
2N
→ 0 as N →∞, we may assume for simplicity that N is odd.
The dynamics of the N -player game then reduce to
(7.2)

XNi,1(t)XNi,2(t)
XNi,3(t)

 =

ξ
N
i,1 +
∫ t
0 ui,1(s,X
N )ds− t ·
(∣∣∣ 1N ∑Nj=1 ξNj,2∣∣∣ ∧ 14)
ξNi,2
t


t ∈ [0, 2], for any admissible strategy vector u. The associated costs for
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player i are, in view of (7.1),
JNi (u) = 2 +EN

1 + 1
6
∫ 2
0
ui,1(s,X
N )ds−
1
3

∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4



 .1
Let us turn to the limit model. Given a flow of measures p ∈ M and a
stochastic-open loop control ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) ∈ A such thatP ◦ξ
−1 =
ν, the dynamics are given by
(7.3)
X1(t)X2(t)
X3(t)

 =

ξ1ξ2
0

+ ∫ t
0

α1(s)−
∣∣∫
R3
w(y)p(s, dy)
∣∣ ∧ 14
0
1

 ds, t ∈ [0, 2].
Notice that ξ1, ξ2 are independent Rademacher variables.
Suppose that p is such that, for all t ∈ [0, 2], supp(p(t)) ⊆ cl(O) and∫
R3
w(y)p(t, dy) = 0. The dynamics then reduce to
(7.4)

X1(t)X2(t)
X3(t)

 =

ξ1 +
∫ t
0 α1(s)ds
ξ2
t

 ,
while the associated expected costs are equal to E[ζα] where
ζα(ω)
.
= τX(ω) ∧ 2 + 1 +
τX(ω) ∧ 2
12
·X1(τ
X(ω) ∧ 2, ω), ω ∈ Ω.
Since α1 takes values in [−1, 1] and ξ1 values in {−1, 1}, we have, P-almost
surely,
(7.5) − 1− t ≤ X1(t) ≤ 1 + t for all t ∈ [0, 2].
By construction of O, it follows that, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω, X(·, ω)
leaves O before time T = 2 if and only if ξ1(ω) = 1 and α1(t, ω) = 1 for
Lesbegue almost every t ∈ [0, 1]. In this case, τX(ω) = 1, X1(1, ω) = 2, and
ζα(ω) = 2+ 1/6. If X(·, ω) does not leave O before the terminal time, then,
by (7.5), ζα(ω) ≥ 2+1/2, and the optimal control is to choose α1(t, ω) = −1
for almost every t ∈ [0, 2]. Therefore, if for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω,
(7.6) α(t, ω) =
{
(1, 0, 0)T if ξ1(ω) = 1 and t ∈ [0, 1],
(−1, 0, 0)T if ξ1(ω) = −1 or t > 1,
1It is easy to see that if u is such that ui,1 ≡ −1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, then u is a
Nash equilibrium for the N-player game.
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then
E[ζα] =
1
2
(
2 +
1
6
)
+
1
2
(
2 +
1
2
)
= 2 +
1
3
and α is optimal in the sense that
E[ζα] = V (ν; p).
Now, choose ((Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ, α,W ) ∈ A such that P ◦ξ
−1 = ν and
(ξ, α) satisfies (7.6) P-almost surely. Let X be the unique strong solution of
Eq. (7.4), and define a flow of measures p∗ according to
p∗(t, ·)
.
= P(X ∈ · | τX > t), t ∈ [0, 2].
Notice that P(τX > t) ≥ 1/2 for all t ∈ [0, 2]; thus, p∗ is well defined. By
construction, supp(p∗) ⊆ cl(O), which implies∫
R3
w(y)p∗(t, dy) =
∫
R3
y2p∗(t, dy).
We are going to show that
∫
R3
w(y)p∗(t, dy) = 0 for all t ∈ [0, 2]. By
definition of ν, X1(0), X2(0), X3(0) are independent. Moreover, X3 is (al-
most surely) deterministic, while α1 is measurable with respect to σ(ξ1) =
σ(X1(0)). This implies that the real-valued processes X1, X2, X3 are inde-
pendent. The time of first exit τX can be rewritten in terms of X1 and X3
only. It follows that τX and X2 are independent, hence∫
R3
w(y)p∗(t, dy) =
∫
R3
y2p∗(t, dy)
= EP [X2(t)] = EP [X2(0)] =
∫
R
zρ(dz) = 0.
As a consequence, X solves Eq. (7.3) with flow of measures p = p∗ and the
associated costs are optimal in the sense that
E[ζα] = V (ν; p∗).
Recall that p∗ was defined as the conditional flow of measures for the law
of X. Since X solves Eq. (7.3) with flow of measures p = p∗, the conditional
mean field property of Definition 4.1 holds.
Relation (7.6) between the open-loop control α and the initial condition
ξ induces a feedback strategy in U1, namely
u∗(t, ϕ) =


(1, 0, 0)T if ϕ1(0) = 1 and t ∈ [0, 1],
(−1, 0, 0)T if ϕ1(0) = −1 or t > 1,
arbitrary otherwise.
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For pairs (t, ϕ) where the control is unspecified, we may choose the control
actions in such a way that u∗ becomes Lipschitz continuous in the state
variable at every point in time; to be specific, set
u∗(t, ϕ)
.
=
{
(−1 ∨ ϕ1(0) ∧ 1, 0, 0)
T if t ∈ [0, 1],
(−1, 0, 0)T if t > 1.
Eq. (4.1) is well posed under u∗ given the flow of measures p∗ and any
initial distribution with support in O. Let ((Ω∗,F∗,P∗), (F
∗
t ), W¯ ,X
∗) be a
solution of Eq. (4.1) under u∗ with flow of measures p∗ and initial distribution
ν = ρ⊗ ρ⊗ δ0. Then, by construction,
P∗ ◦(X
∗)−1 = P ◦X−1.
This implies the optimality property
J(ν, u∗; p∗) = V (ν; p∗),
but also the conditional mean field property of Definition 4.1, namely
p∗(t) = P(X ∈ · | τ
X > t) = P∗(X
∗ ∈ · | τX
∗
> t) for all t ∈ [0, 2].
It follows that (ν, u∗, p∗) is a feedback solution of the mean field game.
Let us check whether or not the feedback strategy u∗ induces a sequence of
approximate Nash equilibria in analogy with Theorem 5.1. Thus, for N ∈ N,
define uN = (uN1 , . . . , u
N
N ) by
uNi (t,ϕ)
.
= u∗(t, ϕi), t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ = (ϕ1, . . . , ϕN ) ∈ X
N , i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Equation (3.1) has a unique solution under uN with initial distribution νN
because b¯, w are Lipschitz continuous in the state variable and uN is measur-
able with respect to σ(XN (0)). Therefore, uN ∈ UNfb. For simplicity, assume
again that N is odd. LetXN be the unique strong solution of Equation (7.2)
under uN . Then, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
JNi (u
N ) = 2 +EN

1 + 1
6
∫ 2
0
u∗(s,XNi )ds−
1
3

∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4




= 3−
1
2
·
2
6
−
1
3
EN

∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4


≥
33
12
.
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Suppose player one deviates from uN by choosing the strategy that is con-
stant and equal to −1. Denote that strategy by v. Notice that [uN,−1, v] ∈
UNfb. For the associated costs, we have
JN1 ([u
N,−1, v]) = 2 +EN

1− 2
6
−
1
3

∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4




= 3−
1
3
−
1
3
EN

∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
j=1
ξNj,2
∣∣∣ ∧ 1
4


≤
32
12
.
Player one can thus save costs of at least 1/12 by deviating from uN for
every N odd (asymptotically, also for N even). It follows that the strategy
vectors induced by the feedback solution (ν, u∗, p∗) of the mean field game
do not yield approximate Nash equilibria with vanishing error.
APPENDIX
Let ν ∈ P(Rd) with support in O. Recall the definition of Θν ∈ P(X )
in (5.1) at the beginning of Section 5, and also the definition of the sets
Qν,c ⊂ P(X ), c ≥ 0, given there.
Let σ be a d× d-matrix, and let
bˆ : [0, T ]× X ×P(X )→ Rd, b˜N : [0, T ] × X
N × P(X )→ Rd, N ∈ N,
be functions such that the following hold:
(ND) Non-degeneracy: σ is invertible.
(M) Measurability: bˆ, b˜N , N ∈ N, are Borel measurable and progressive in
the sense that, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
bˆ(t, ϕ, θ) = bˆ(t, ϕ˜, θ˜) whenever ϕ|[0,t] = ϕ˜|[0,t] and θ|Gt = θ˜|Gt,
and analogously for b˜N .
(B) Boundedness: there exists a finite constant K > 0 such that
‖bˆ‖∞ ∨ sup
N∈N
‖b˜N‖∞ ≤ K.
For each N ∈ N, let νN ∈ P(R
N×d) be symmetric with supp(νN ) ⊂ O
N ,
as above. We assume, in addition to (ND), (M), and (B):
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(I) Initial distributions: the sequence (νN )N∈N is ν-chaotic, where ν has
support in O.
(C) Almost continuity: for Lebesgue a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], every θ ∈ Qν,K ,
Θν
(
ϕ ∈ X : ∃ (ϕn, θn) ⊂ X × P(X ) such that bˆ(t, ϕn, θn) 6→ bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)
while (ϕn, θn)→ (ϕ, θ)
)
= 0.
In Section C of this Appendix, we will make the following assumption of
partial Lipschitz continuity:
(L) Lipschitz continuity in the measure variable: There exists a finite con-
stant L > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], all ϕ ∈ X ,∣∣∣bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)− bˆ(t, ϕ, θ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ L · dt(θ, θ˜) whenever θ, θ˜ ∈ Qν,K ,
where the distances dt are pseudo-metrics derived from the total variation
distance; see below.
APPENDIX B: CONVERGENCE OF EMPIRICAL MEASURES
For N ∈ N, consider the system of equations
XN1 (t) = X
N
1 (0) +
∫ t
0
b˜N
(
s,XN , µN
)
ds+ σWN1 (t),
XNi (t) = X
N
i (0) +
∫ t
0
bˆ
(
s,XNi , µ
N
)
ds+ σWNi (t),
i ∈ {2, . . . , N}, t ∈ [0, T ],
(B.1)
where WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N are independent d-dimensional Wiener processes de-
fined on some filtered probability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P), and µ
N is the em-
pirical measure of the players’ state trajectories, that is,
µNω (·)
.
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
δXNj
(·, ω), ω ∈ Ω.
A solution of Eq. (B.1) with initial distribution νN is given by a triple
((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W
N ,XN ) such that (Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a filtered probability
space satisfying the usual hypotheses, WN = (WN1 , . . . ,W
N
N ) a vector of in-
dependent d-dimensional (Ft)-Wiener processes, and X
N = (XN1 , . . . ,X
N
N )
a vector of continuous Rd-valued (Ft)-adapted processes such that Eq. (B.1)
holds P-almost surely with P ◦(XN (0))−1 = νN .
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As in Section 3, existence and uniqueness in law of solutions to Eq. (B.1)
hold thanks to Girsanov’s theorem and assumptions (ND), (M), and (B).
Now, for each N ∈ N, take a solution ((ΩN ,FN , (F
N
t ),PN ),W
N ,XN ) of
Eq. (B.1) with initial distribution νN , and let µ
N be the associated empirical
measure on the path space X .
Lemma B.1. Grant (ND), (M), (B), (I), and (C). Then (PN ◦(µ
N )−1)N∈N
is tight in P(P(X )), and its limit points have support in Qν,K .
Proof. For N ∈ N, let ιN be the intensity measure of PN ◦(µ
N )−1, that
is,
ιN (A)
.
= EN
[
µN (A)
]
, A ∈ B(X ).
Tightness of (PN ◦(µ
N )−1) in P(P(X )) is then equivalent to the tightness
of (ιN ) in P(X ) [cf. (2.5) in 40, p. 178]. By construction,
ιN (A) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PN
(
XNi ∈ A
)
, A ∈ B(X ).
It is therefore enough to check that the family (P ◦(XNi )
−1)N∈N,i∈{1,...,N} is
tight. Now, for N ∈ N, i ∈ {1, . . . , N},
PN
(
XNi (0) ∈ cl(O)
)
= 1,
and cl(O) is compact since O is open and bounded. Moreover, thanks to
assumption (B), for all s, t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣XNi (t)−XNi (s)∣∣ ≤ K · |t− s|+ |σ| · ∣∣WNi (t)−WNi (s)∣∣ ,
where we recall that WNi is a standard Wiener process under PN . Tight-
ness of (PN ◦(X
N
i )
−1) is now a consequence of the Kolmogorov-Chentsov
tightness criterion [for instance, Corollary 16.9 in 24, p. 313].
As to the support of the limit points of (PN ◦(µ
N )−1), we interpret the
drift terms appearing in (B.1) as stochastic relaxed controls. To this end,
set R
.
= RBK(0), where BK(0) ⊂ R
d is the closed ball of radius K around
the origin. Then R is compact (cf. Appendix F). For N ∈ N, let ρNi be the
R-valued (FNt )-adapted random measure determined by
ρNi,ω
(
B × I
) .
=
{∫
I δb˜N (t,XN (·,ω),µNω )
(B)dt if i = 1,∫
I δbˆ(t,XNi (·,ω),µNω )
(B)dt if i > 1,
B ∈ B(Γ), I ∈ B([0, T ]), ω ∈ ΩN .
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We can rewrite Eq. (B.1) in terms of ρN1 , . . . , ρ
N
N :
XNi (t) = X
N
i (0) +
∫
BK(0)×[0,t]
y ρNi (dy, ds) + σW
N
i (t),
i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, t ∈ [0, T ].
(B.2)
Now, form the extended empirical measure
QNω
.
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(XNi (·,ω),ρNi,ω)
, ω ∈ ΩN .
Thus, QN is a P(X ×R)-valued random variable, and the projection on its
first component coincides with µN . The family (PN ◦(Q
N )−1)N∈N is tight
in P(P(X ×R)) thanks to the first part of the proof and the fact that R is
compact.
With a slight abuse of notation, let (Xˆ, ρˆ) denote the canonical process on
X×R. Let (Pn ◦(Q
n)−1)n∈I be a convergent subsequence of (PN ◦(Q
N )−1)N∈N,
and let Q be a P(X×R)-valued random variable defined on some probability
space (Ω,F ,P) such that
Qn → Q in distribution as I ∋ n→∞.
We have to show that Qω ◦ Xˆ
−1 ∈ Qν,K for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω. To this
end, define a process Wˆ on X ×R by
Wˆ (t)
.
= σ−1
(
Xˆ(t)− Xˆ(0)−
∫
B¯K(0)×[0,t]
y ρˆ(dy, ds)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
By a martingale argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma B.2, but
using Eq. (B.2), one checks that Wˆ is a standard Wiener process under Qω
for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω. This entails that Xˆ solves Eq. (5.2) under Qω
with BK(0)-valued control process
v(t, (ϕ, r))
.
=
∫
BK(0)
y r˙t(dy), t ∈ [0, T ], (ϕ, r) ∈ X ×R.
It follows that Qω ◦ Xˆ
−1 ∈ Qν,K for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω.
In order to further characterize the limit points of (PN ◦(µ
N )−1)N∈N,
consider, for θ ∈ P(X ), the equation
(B.3) X(t) = X(0) +
∫ t
0
bˆ (s,X, θ) ds+ σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
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where W is a d-dimensional Wiener process defined on some filtered prob-
ability space. A solution of Eq. (B.3) with measure θ ∈ P(X ) and initial
distribution ν is a triple ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) such that (Ω,F , (Ft),P) is a
filtered probability space satisfying the usual hypotheses,W a d-dimensional
(Ft)-Wiener process, and X an R
d-valued (Ft)-adapted process such that
(B.3) holds P-almost surely with P ◦(X(0))−1 = ν and drift coefficient
bˆ(·, ·, θ). Again thanks to Girsanov’s theorem and assumptions (ND), (M),
and (B), existence and uniqueness in law of solutions to Eq. (B.3) hold for
each fixed θ ∈ P(X ).
Recall that Xˆ denotes the canonical process on X .
Definition B.1. A measure θ ∈ P(X ) is called a McKean-Vlasov solu-
tion of Eq. (B.3) if there exists a solution ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) of Eq. (B.3)
with initial distribution θ ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 and measure θ such that P ◦X−1 = θ.
By uniqueness in law (with fixed measure θ), if P ◦X−1 = θ holds for
one solution ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) of Eq. (B.3) with measure θ and initial
distribution θ ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1, then it holds for any such solution of Eq. (B.3).
According to the next lemma, limit points of the sequence of empirical mea-
sures (µN )N∈N are almost surely concentrated on McKean-Vlasov solutions
of Eq. (B.3). This yields, in particular, existence of McKean-Vlasov solu-
tions. Those solutions do not necessarily have the same law.
Lemma B.2. Grant (ND), (M), (B), (I), and (C). Let (Pn ◦(µ
n)−1)n∈I
be a convergent subsequence of the family (PN ◦(µ
N )−1)N∈N, and let µ be
a P(X )-valued random variable defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P)
such that
µn → µ in distribution as I ∋ n→∞.
Then µω is a McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3) for P-almost every ω ∈
Ω.
Proof. Thanks to hypothesis (I), we have µω ◦ (Xˆ(0))
−1 = ν for P-
almost every ω ∈ Ω.
In the proof, we use the characterization of solutions to Eq. (B.3) with
fixed measure variable through a martingale problem in the sense of Stroock
and Varadhan [39]; also see Karatzas and Shreve [25, Section 5.4]. Since
the coefficients in (B.3) are bounded, we can employ a “true” martingale
problem instead of a local martingale problem and work with test functions
that have compact support. For a test function g ∈ C2c(R
d) and a measure
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θ ∈ P(X ), define the process Mθg on (X ,B(X )) by
Mθg (t, ϕ)
.
= g
(
ϕ(t)
)
− g
(
ϕ(0)
)
−
∫ t
0

bˆ(s, ϕ, θ) · ∇g + 1
2
d∑
i,j=1
(σσT)ij
∂2g
∂xi∂xj

(ϕ(s))ds.
Recall that (Gt) is the canonical filtration in B(X ) and that Xˆ is the
coordinate process on X . We have to show that, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω,
µω solves the martingale problem associated with bˆ(·, ·, µω) and σσ
T, that
is, for every test function g ∈ C2c(R
d), the process Mµωg is a (Gt)-martingale
under µω. Although (Gt) is a “raw” filtration (i.e., not necessarily right-
continuous or µω-complete), checking the martingale property with respect
to (Gt) is sufficient; see, for instance, Problem 5.4.13 in Karatzas and Shreve
[25, pp. 318-319, 392]. Indeed, ifMµωg is a (Gt)-martingale under µω for every
g ∈ C2c(R
d), then ((X ,B(X ), (Gµωt+ ), µω), Wˆ , Xˆ) is a solution of Eq. (B.3)
with initial distribution ν, where (Gµωt+ ) indicates the right-continuous µω-
augmentation of (Gt) and Wˆ is defined by
Wˆ (t)
.
= σ−1
(
Xˆ(t)− Xˆ(0)−
∫ t
0
bˆ
(
s, Xˆ, µω
)
ds
)
, t ∈ [0, T ].
Since µω ◦ Xˆ
−1 = µω, it then follows that µω is a McKean-Vlasov solution
of Eq. (B.3) in the sense of Definition B.1. For this implication to hold,
it suffices to take a countable collection of test functions g ∈ C2c(R
d) that
approximate the d-variate monomials of first and second order.
Let θ ∈ P(X ). The processes Mθg are, by construction and thanks to as-
sumptions (B) and (M), bounded, measurable, and (Gt)-adapted. The mar-
tingale property of Mθg is equivalent to having
(B.4) Eθ
[
ψ ·
(
Mθg (t1)−M
θ
g (t0)
)]
= 0
for every choice of (t0, t1, ψ) ∈ [0, T ]
2 × Cb(X ) such that t0 ≤ t1 and ψ is
Gt0 -measurable. Since the σ-algebras Gt are countably generated, the pro-
cesses Mθg have continuous trajectories, and since the test functions can be
taken from a countable family, we can choose a countable collection of test
parameters T ⊂ [0, T ]2×Cb(X )×C
2
c(R
d) with the following two properties:
First, for every (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T we have t0 ≤ t1 and ψ is Gt0-measurable;
second, if θ ∈ P(X ) is such that (B.4) holds for every (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T , then
θ is a McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3). In the following three steps, we
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will show that there exists Ω¯ ∈ F such that P(Ω¯) = 1 and, for every ω ∈ Ω¯,
(B.4) with θ = µω holds for all (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T .
Step 1. Let (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T . Define a function Ψ = Ψ(t0,t1,ψ,g) : P(X )→
R by
Ψ(θ) = Ψ(t0,t1,ψ,g)(θ)
.
= Eθ
[
ψ ·
(
Mθg (t1)−M
θ
g (t0)
)]
.
Notice that Ψ is well defined (the expectation on the right-hand side is
finite), Borel measurable, and bounded. We claim that Ψ is continuous at
every θ ∈ Qν,K . To see this, let θ ∈ Qν,K and (θn)n∈N ⊂ P(X ) be such that
θn → θ as n→∞. Define bounded measurable functions hn, h : [0, T ]×X →
R according to
hn(s, ϕ)
.
= ψ(ϕ) · bˆ(s, ϕ, θn) ·
(
d∑
i=1
∂g
∂xi
(
ϕ(s)
))
, n ∈ N,
h(s, ϕ)
.
= ψ(ϕ) · bˆ(s, ϕ, θ) ·
(
d∑
i=1
∂g
∂xi
(
ϕ(s)
))
, (s, ϕ) ∈ [0, T ]× X .
By hypothesis, θn → θ in the sense of weak convergence of probability
measures. The functions ψ, σ (constant) as well as g together with its first
and second order partial derivatives are all bounded and continuous. In order
to establish the convergence of Ψ(θn) to Ψ(θ) it is therefore enough to verify
that ∫
X
∫ t1
t0
hn(s, ϕ)ds θn(dϕ)
n→∞
−→
∫
X
∫ t1
t0
h(s, ϕ)ds θ(dϕ).
The functions h, hn, n ∈ N, are uniformly bounded. By dominated conver-
gence and the Fubini-Tonelli theorem, it thus suffices to check that
(B.5)
∫
X
hn(s, ϕ) θn(dϕ)
n→∞
−→
∫
X
h(s, ϕ) θ(dϕ) for almost every s ∈ [0, T ].
For s ∈ [0, T ], set
Es
.
= {ϕ ∈ X : ∃(ϕn) ⊂ X : hn(s, ϕn) 6→ h(s, ϕ) while ϕn → ϕ} .
The functions ψ, ∂g∂xi , i ∈ {1, . . . , d}, are continuous and bounded. The choice
of θ ∈ Qν,K entails that θ is absolutely continuous with respect to Θν . By
(C), the assumption of almost continuity, it follows that
θ(Es) = 0 for Lebesgue almost every s ∈ [0, T ].
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The extended mapping theorem [Theorem 5.5 in 2, p. 34] now implies that
(B.5) holds. It follows that Ψ is continuous at θ ∈ Qν,K .
Step 2. Let again (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T . We are going to show that
(B.6) EP
[(
Ψ(t0,t1,ψ,g)(µ)
)2]
= 0.
Recall that Ψ = Ψ(t0,t1,ψ,g) is bounded and, by the previous step, contin-
uous at every θ ∈ Qν,K . By Lemma B.1, we have P (µ ∈ Qν,K) = 1. By
hypothesis, µn → µ in distribution as I ∋ n → ∞. The mapping theorem
[Theorem 5.1 in 2, p. 30] thus implies that
EP
[
(Ψ(µ))2
]
= lim
I∋n→∞
EPn
[
(Ψ(µn))2
]
.
Now, for every n ∈ I, using Itoˆ’s formula and Eq. (B.1),
EPn
[
(Ψ(µn))2
]
= EPn

( 1
n
n∑
i=1
ψ(Xni ) ·
(
Mµ
n
g (t1,X
n
i )−M
µn
g (t0,X
n
i )
))2
=
1
n2
EPn
[(
ψ(Xn1 ) ·
∫ t1
t0
(
b˜n(s,X
n, µn)− bˆ(s,Xn1 , µω)
)
· ∇g
(
Xn1 (s)
)
ds
+
n∑
i=1
ψ(Xni ) ·
∫ t1
t0
∇g
(
Xni (s)
)
T
σdW ni (s)
)2 .
The functions ψ, σ (constant), ∇g, b, and bˆn are bounded, uniformly in
n ∈ I; cf. assumption (B). Since ψ is Gt0-measurable, the random variables
ψ(Xn1 ), . . . , ψ(X
n
n ) are F
n
t0-measurable. The Wiener processes W
n
1 , . . . ,W
n
n
are independent. Setting
B˜n1
.
=
∫ t1
t0
(
b˜n(s,X
n, µn)− bˆ(s,Xn1 , µω)
)
· ∇g
(
Xn1 (s)
)
ds,
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we obtain
EPn
[
(Ψ(µn))2
]
=
1
n2
EPn
[(
ψ(Xn1 ) · B˜
n
1
)2]
+
2
n2
EPn
[
n∑
i=1
ψ(Xni ) · ψ(X
n
1 ) · B˜
n
1 ·
∫ t1
t0
∇g
(
Xni (s)
)
T
σdW ni (s)
]
+
1
n2
EPn
[
n∑
i=1
(ψ(Xni ))
2 ·
∫ t1
t0
∇g
(
Xni (s)
)T
σσT∇g
(
Xni (s)
)
ds
]
I∋n→∞
−→ 0,
where convergence to zero follows from the uniform boundedness of the
integrands (and the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality).
Step 3. By Step 2, we have that (B.6) holds for every t = (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T .
For every t ∈ T , we can therefore select At ∈ F such that P(At) = 1 and
Ψ(µω) = 0 for every ω ∈ At. Set Ω¯
.
=
⋂
t∈T At. Then P(Ω¯) = 1 since T is
countable, and Ψ(µω) = 0 for every ω ∈ Ω¯. Hence, for P-almost every ω ∈ Ω,
µω is such that (B.4) with θ = µω holds for every (t0, t1, ψ, g) ∈ T .
APPENDIX C: UNIQUENESS OF MCKEAN-VLASOV SOLUTIONS
Here, we consider McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq. (B.3) in the sense of
Definition B.1 and obtain a uniqueness result.
On P(X ) define the following distances derived from the total variation
distance by setting, for t ∈ [0, T ],
dt(θ, θ˜)
.
= sup
A∈Gt
∣∣∣θ(A)− θ˜(A)∣∣∣ , θ, θ˜ ∈ P(X ).
Notice that dt are pseudo-metrics for t ∈ [0, T ), while dT is a true metric
since GT = B(X ).
Let K be the constant from assumption (B), ν ∈ P(Rd) the initial distri-
bution. We will assume the following partial Lipschitz property with respect
to the measure argument of bˆ:
(L) There exists a finite constant L > 0 such that for all t ∈ [0, T ], all
ϕ ∈ X ,∣∣∣bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)− bˆ(t, ϕ, θ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ L · dt(θ, θ˜) whenever θ, θ˜ ∈ Qν,K .
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Notice that condition (L) does not require bˆ to be Lipschitz continuous or
simply continuous with respect to the trajectory variable ϕ ∈ X . In fact,
for the following uniqueness result to be valid, bˆ need not satisfy (C), the
assumption of almost continuity, either.
Proposition C.1. Grant (ND), (M), (B), and (L). Then there exists
at most one McKean-Vlasov solution of Eq. (B.3) with initial distribution
ν.
Proof. Suppose θ, θ˜ ∈ P(X ) are McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq. (B.3)
with initial distribution ν = θ ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1 = θ˜ ◦ (Xˆ(0))−1. We have to show
that θ = θ˜.
Observe that θ and θ˜, being McKean-Vlasov solutions of Eq. (B.3) with
initial distribution ν, are elements of Qν,K . In particular, the Lipschitz prop-
erty expressed in (L) applies to θ, θ˜.
Step 1. Set γ
.
= Θν and, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (t)
.
= exp
(∫ t
0
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ) · dXˆ(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ)
T
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ)ds
)
,
Y˜ (t)
.
= exp
(∫ t
0
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜) · dXˆ(s)
−
1
2
∫ t
0
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜)
T
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜)ds
)
.
Then Y , Y˜ are well defined under γ and, for every t ∈ [0, T ],
dθ
dγ
∣∣∣
Gt
= Y (t),
dθ˜
dγ
∣∣∣
Gt
= Y˜ (t).(C.1)
The equalities in (C.1) are a consequence of the Cameron-Martin-Girsanov
formula; see Theorem 6.4.2 in Stroock and Varadhan [39, p. 154]. For the
sake of completeness, we derive (C.1) from a standard version of Girsanov’s
formula. First observe that Y , Y˜ are well defined if the stochastic integral
that appears in the exponential is well defined. This is the case if we take γ
as our reference probability measure since Xˆ is a vector of continuous mar-
tingales under γ, while the integrands bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ) and bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜), respectively,
are bounded progressively measurable processes with respect to (Gt) thanks
to assumptions (M) and (B).
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As to the densities given in (C.1), it is enough to prove the assertion for
θ, the proof for θ˜ being completely analogous. Let ((Ω,F , (Ft),P),W,X) be
a solution of Eq. (B.3) with initial distribution ν and measure θ such that
P ◦X−1 = θ; such a solution exists by hypothesis.
Define a process Z on (Ω,F) by setting
Z(t)
.
= e−
∫ t
0 σ
−1 bˆ(s,X,θ)·dW (s)− 1
2
∫ t
0 |σ
−1 bˆ(s,X,θ)|
2
ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then Z is a martingale with respect to P and (Ft), and
Q(A)
.
= EP [Z(T )1A] , A ∈ F ,
defines a probability measure such that
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= Z(t) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
By Girsanov’s Theorem [Theorem 3.5.1 25, p. 191] and Eq. (B.3), we have
that
σ−1 (X(·) −X(0)) =W (·) +
∫ ·
0
σ−1bˆ(s,X, θ)ds
is an (Ft)-Wiener process under Q. Thus, since X(0) is F0-measurable, X(0)
and X(·) −X(0) are independent under Q. It follows that
Q ◦X−1 = P ◦ (X(0) + σW )−1 = γ.
Using again Eq. (B.3), we obtain with probability one under P as well as
under Q that for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Z(t) = e−
∫ t
0(σσ
T)
−1
bˆ(s,X,θ)·dX(s)+ 1
2
∫ t
0 |σ
−1 bˆ(s,X,θ)|
2
ds,
1
Z(t)
= e
∫ t
0 (σσ
T)
−1
bˆ(s,X,θ)·dX(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
bˆ(s,X,θ)
T
(σσT)
−1
bˆ(s,X,θ)ds.
The process X is a vector of continuous semimartingales with respect to P
as well as Q, with quadratic covariation processes
〈Xi,Xj〉 (t) = t ·
(
σσT
)
ij
, t ∈ [0, T ], P-/Q-almost surely.
It follows that 1/Z is a stochastic exponential, hence a local martingale,
under Q. Since bˆ is bounded, 1/Z is a true martingale under Q. As a conse-
quence,
dP
dQ
∣∣∣
Ft
=
1
Z(t)
for every t ∈ [0, T ].
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Recall that Q ◦X−1 = γ. Comparing the expressions for 1/Z and Y , we
find that
Q ◦
(
1
Z(t)
,X
)−1
= γ ◦
(
Y (t), Xˆ
)−1
for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Since θ = P ◦X−1, it follows that, for every B ∈ Gt,
θ(B) = EP [1B(X)] = EQ
[
1
Z(t)
1B(X)
]
= Eγ
[
Y (t)1B(Xˆ)
]
,
hence dθdγ
∣∣
Gt
= Y (t) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Step 2.We are going to show that there exists a constant C ∈ (0,∞) de-
pending only on T , K, and σ, such that for every bounded and progressively
measurable functional ψ : [0, T ]× X → R, every t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣∣Eθ [ψ(t, Xˆ)]−Eθ˜ [ψ(t, Xˆ)]∣∣∣2 ≤ C · ‖ψ‖2∞
∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds.
Indeed, by (C.1), for every t ∈ [0, T ],
Eθ
[
ψ(t, Xˆ)
]
−Eθ˜
[
ψ(t, Xˆ)
]
= Eγ
[(
Y (t)− Y˜ (t)
)
ψ(t, Xˆ)
]
Under γ, Xˆ is a martingale with quadratic covariation processes
〈Xi,Xj〉 (t) = t ·
(
σσT
)
ij
, t ∈ [0, T ],
while Y , Y˜ are stochastic exponentials. In fact, setting
M(t)
.
=
∫ t
0
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ) · dXˆ(s),
M˜(t)
.
=
∫ t
0
(
σσT
)−1
bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜) · dXˆ(s),
we have, with probability one under γ,
Y (t) = exp
(
M(t)−
1
2
〈M〉(t)
)
, Y˜ (t) = exp
(
M˜ (t)−
1
2
〈M˜〉(t)
)
.
Therefore (by Itoˆ’s formula), with probability one under γ,
Y (t) = 1 +
∫ t
0
Y (s)dM(s), Y˜ (t) = 1 +
∫ t
0
Y˜ (s)dM˜ (s), t ∈ [0, T ].
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The invertibility of σ and the boundedness assumption (B) imply that
(C.2) sup
t∈[0,T ]
{
Eγ
[
|Y (t)|2
]
∨Eγ
[∣∣∣Y˜ (t)∣∣∣2]} ≤ eT ·K2‖σ−1‖2 .= eTC0 ,
where ‖·‖ denotes the Hilbert-Schmidt matrix norm. The bound (C.2) holds
since
Y (t)2 = exp
(
2M(t) −
1
2
〈2M〉(t)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
stochastic exponential under γ
exp (〈M〉(t)) ,
while supt∈[0,T ] |〈M〉(t)| ≤ T · C0 γ-almost surely by the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality; analogously for the tilde part.
Using Itoˆ’s isometry, (C.2), and assumption (L), we obtain, for every
t ∈ [0, T ],
Eγ
[∣∣∣Y (t)− Y˜ (t)∣∣∣2]
= Eγ
[∣∣∣∣
∫ t
0
(
σσT
)−1 (
Y (s)bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ)− Y˜ (s)bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜)
)
· dXˆ(s)
∣∣∣∣2
]
≤
∫ t
0
Eγ
[∥∥σ−1∥∥2 ∣∣∣Y (s)bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ)− Y˜ (s)bˆ(s, Xˆ, θ˜)∣∣∣2] ds
≤ 2
∥∥σ−1∥∥2 L2eTC0 ∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds + 2C0
∫ t
0
Eγ
[∣∣∣Y (s)− Y˜ (s)∣∣∣2] ds,
hence, thanks to Gronwall’s lemma,
Eγ
[∣∣∣Y (t)− Y˜ (t)∣∣∣2] ≤ 2∥∥σ−1∥∥2 L2e3TC0 ∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
It follows that, for every t ∈ [0, T ],∣∣∣Eθ [ψ(t, Xˆ)]−Eθ˜ [ψ(t, Xˆ)]∣∣∣2
≤ Eγ
[∣∣∣Y (t)− Y˜ (t)∣∣∣2 |ψ(t, Xˆ)|2]
≤ ‖ψ‖2∞ · 2
∥∥σ−1∥∥2 L2e3TC0 ∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds.
Step 3. For t ∈ [0, T ], A ∈ Gt, define ψ(A,t) : [0, T ]× X → R through
ψ(A,t)(s, ϕ)
.
=
{
1A(ϕ) if s ≥ t,
0 otherwise.
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Then ψ(A,t) is bounded and progressively measurable with ‖ψ(A,t)‖∞ = 1.
By Step 2, there exists a finite constant C, depending only on T , K, σ, such
that for every t ∈ [0, T ],
sup
A∈Gt
∣∣∣θ(A)− θ˜(A)∣∣∣2
= sup
A∈Gt
∣∣∣Eθ [ψ(A,t)(t, Xˆ)]−Eθ˜ [ψ(A,t)(t, Xˆ)]∣∣∣2
≤ C ·
∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds.
By the definition of the total variation semi-distances, it follows that
dt(θ, θ˜)
2 ≤ C ·
∫ t
0
ds(θ, θ˜)
2ds for all t ∈ [0, T ],
hence, thanks to Gronwall’s lemma, dT (θ, θ˜) = 0. Since dT is a true metric,
we obtain θ = θ˜.
APPENDIX D: REGULARITY RESULTS
Here, we collect some (well known) regularity results on the exit time τ Xˆ
with respect to measures in Qν,K . Recall that τ
Xˆ is the time of first exit
from O on path space:
τ Xˆ(ϕ) = τ(ϕ)
.
= inf {t ≥ 0 : ϕ(t) /∈ O} , ϕ ∈ X ,
where O is a bounded open set satisfying (H5).
Lemma D.1. Let K ≥ 0. Then Qν,K is compact in P(X ).
Proof. Recall that Qν,K is the set of all laws of processes of the form
X(t) = ξ +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds + σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
whereW is an Rd-valued (Ft)-Wiener process defined on some filtered prob-
ability space (Ω,F , (Ft),P), ξ is an R
d-valued F0-measurable random vari-
able with distribution P ◦ξ−1 = ν, and v is an Rd-valued (Ft)-progressively
measurable bounded process with ‖v‖∞ ≤ K. By the boundedness of the
control processes v and the Kolmogorov-Chentsov tightness criterion [for
instance, Corollary 16.9 in 24, p. 313], we have that Qν,K is tight, hence
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precompact in P(X ). By interpreting the control processes v as relaxed con-
trols, using arguments analogous to those of the second part of the proof of
Lemma B.1, one checks that Qν,K coincides with its own closure. It follows
that Qν,K is compact.
Lemma D.2. Let K > 0. Any measure θ ∈ Qν,K is equivalent to Θν.
Moreover, there exists a strictly positive constant c0 depending only on d, ν,
T , and K, such that
inf
θ∈Qν,K
Eθ
[
1
[0,τ Xˆ)
(T )
]
≥ c0 > 0.
Proof. Let θ ∈ Qν,K . Let (Ω,F , (Ft),P) be a filtered probability space
carrying an Rd-valued (Ft)-Wiener process W , an R
d-valued F0-measurable
random variable ξ with P ◦ξ−1 = ν, and an Rd-valued (Ft)-progressively
measurable bounded process v with ‖v‖∞ ≤ K such that the process
X(t)
.
= ξ +
∫ t
0
v(s)ds + σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ],
has law P ◦X−1 = θ. Set
B(t)
.
= ξ + σW (t), t ∈ [0, T ].
Define a process Z on (Ω,F) by setting
Z(t)
.
= e−
∫ t
0
σ−1v(s)·dW (s)− 1
2
∫ t
0 |σ
−1v(s)|
2
ds, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then Z is a martingale with respect to P and (Ft), and
Q(A)
.
= EP [Z(T )1A] , A ∈ F ,
defines a probability measure such that
dQ
dP |Ft
= Z(t) for every t ∈ [0, T ].
By using Girsanov’s theorem as in the first step of the proof of Proposi-
tion C.1 and thanks to the boundedness of v, we find that
W˜
.
= σ−1 (X(·)− ξ) =W (·) +
∫ ·
0
σ−1v(s)ds
is an (Ft)-Wiener process under Q,
Q ◦X−1 = P ◦ (ξ + σW )−1 = P ◦B−1,
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and
dP
dQ |Ft
=
1
Z(t)
for every t ∈ [0, T ].
Since a d-dimensional Brownian motion stays in an open ball for any fixed
finite time with strictly positive probability, there exists a constant c0 > 0
depending only on d, ν, and T , such that
inf
t∈[0,T ]
EP
[
1[0,τB)(t)
]
= EP
[
1[0,τB)(T )
]
≥ c0 > 0.
Using Ho¨lder’s inequality, we find that
Eθ
[
1
[0,τ Xˆ)
(T )
]
= EP
[
1[0,τX)(T )
]
= EQ
[
1
Z(T )
· 1[0,τX)(T )
]
≥ EQ
[√
1[0,τX)(T )
]2
EQ [Z(T )]
−1
= EP
[
1[0,τB)(T )
]2
EQ [Z(T )]
−1 ≥
c20
EQ [Z(T )]
.
Now,
Z(T ) = e−
∫ T
0 σ
−1v(s)·dW˜ (s)− 1
2
∫ T
0 |σ
−1v(s)|
2
ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
corresponds to a Q-stochastic exponential
·e
∫ T
0 |σ
−1v(s)|
2
ds,
hence
1
EQ [Z(T )]
≥ e−T ·‖σ
−1‖2·‖v‖2∞ .
Lemma D.3. Let K > 0, and let θ ∈ Qν,K . Then the following hold:
(a) τ Xˆ <∞ θ-almost surely;
(b) the mapping X ∋ ϕ 7→ τ Xˆ(ϕ) ∈ [0,∞] is continuous θ-almost surely;
(c) θ
(
τ Xˆ = t
)
= 0 for every t ≥ 0;
(d) the mapping X ∋ ϕ 7→ 1
[0,τ Xˆ(ϕ))
(t) ∈ R is continuous θ-almost surely
for every t ≥ 0;
Proof. Since θ is equivalent to Θν by Lemma D.2, it is enough to check
the above properties for θ = Θν .
Property (a) is a consequence of the law of the iterated logarithm (as time
tends to infinity), the non-degeneracy of σ, and the fact that O is bounded.
Property (b) follows again from the law of the iterated logarithm, now as
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time goes to zero, the non-degeneracy of σ and the fact that O is open with
smooth boundary; cf., for instance, Kushner and Dupuis [29, pp. 260-261].
Property (d) is a consequence of properties (b) and (c). As to (c), by
continuity of trajectories,
Θν
(
τ Xˆ = t
)
≤ Θν
(
Xˆ(t) ∈ ∂O
)
for every t ≥ 0.
The boundary ∂O has Lebesgue measure zero as it is bounded and of class
C2 by hypothesis. By the non-degeneracy of σ, Xˆ(t) is absolutely continuous
w.r.t. Lebesgue measure, hence Θν(Xˆ(t) ∈ ∂O) = 0. It follows that Θν(τ
Xˆ =
t) = 0.
APPENDIX E: ASSUMPTIONS (C) AND (L)
Throughout this section, we assume that bˆ is defined by (5.4), that is, for
(t, ϕ, θ) ∈ [0, T ] × X × P(X ),
bˆ(t, ϕ, θ) =

u(t, ϕ) + b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
)
if θ(τ > t) > 0,
u(t, ϕ) + b¯ (t, ϕ(t), w(0)) if θ(τ > t) = 0,
where w is bounded continuous according to hypotheses (H1) and (H2), b¯
is bounded measurable and Lipschitz in its third variable according to (H1)
and (H3), b¯(t, ·, ·) is continuous uniformly in t ∈ [0, T ] thanks to (H2), and
u is a feedback strategy such that, for Lebesgue-almost every t ∈ [0, T ],
Θν ({ϕ ∈ X : u(t, ·) is discontinuous at ϕ}) = 0.
We are going to show that bˆ thus defined satisfies conditions (C) and (L)
above.
To establish condition (C), choose K ≥ ‖bˆ‖∞. We have to show that for
Lebesgue almost every t ∈ [0, T ], every θ ∈ Qν,K ,
Θν
(
ϕ ∈ X : ∃ (ϕn, θn) ⊂ X × P(X ) s.th. bˆ(t, ϕn, θn) 6→ bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)
while (ϕn, θn)→ (ϕ, θ)
)
= 0.
(E.1)
Let t ∈ [0, T ] be such that u(t, ·) is Θν-almost surely continuous; this is true
for Lebesgue almost every t ∈ [0, T ] by the continuity assumption on u. Let
θ ∈ Qν,K . Using Part (d) of Lemma D.3, we find At,θ ∈ B(X ) such that
Θν(At,θ) = 1 and, for every ϕ ∈ At,θ, the mappings u(t, ·) and 1[0,τ Xˆ(·))(t)
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are continuous at ϕ. In view of Part (b) of Lemma D.3, one can choose
At,θ such that also the mapping τ
Xˆ(·) is continuous on At,θ. Since Θν and
θ are equivalent, we have θ(At,θ) = 1. Now, let ϕ ∈ At,θ, and let (ϕn, θn) ⊂
X ×P(X ) be such that (ϕn, θn)→ (ϕ, θ) as n→∞. Then, by the mapping
theorem and since 1
[0,τ Xˆ(·))
(t) is θ-almost surely continuous,
∫
X
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θn(dϕ˜)
n→∞
−→
∫
X
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜).
Since w is bounded and continuous, we also have∫
X
w(ϕ˜(t)) · 1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θn(dϕ˜)
n→∞
−→
∫
X
w(ϕ˜(t)) · 1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜).
In view of Lemma D.2,∫
X
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜) = Eθ
[
1
[0,τ Xˆ)
(t)
]
= θ (τ > t) > 0.
Since b¯(t, ·, ·) is bounded and continuous, it follows that
bˆ(t, ϕn, θn) = u(t, ϕn) + b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θn(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θn(dϕ˜)
)
n→∞
−→ u(t, ϕ) + b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)∫
1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
)
= bˆ(t, ϕ, θ),
and we conclude that (E.1) holds.
As to condition (L) from Section C, we have to show that, given K ≥
‖bˆ‖∞, there exists L > 0 (possibly depending on d, ν, T , and K) such that
for all t ∈ [0, T ], all ϕ ∈ X ,
(E.2)
∣∣∣bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)− bˆ(t, ϕ, θ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ L · dt(θ, θ˜) whenever θ, θ˜ ∈ Qν,K .
Thanks to Lemma D.2,
inf
t∈[0,T ]
inf
θ∈Qν,K
θ (τ > t) = inf
θ∈Qν,K
θ (τ > T ) ≥ c0 > 0
for some strictly positive constant c0 depending only on d, ν, T , and K.
Denote by L¯ the Lipschitz constant of b¯ with respect to its third variable
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according to (H3). Let θ, θ˜ ∈ Qν,K . Then for all ϕ ∈ X ,∣∣∣bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)− bˆ(t, ϕ, θ˜)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)
θ(τ > t)
)
−b¯
(
t, ϕ(t),
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ˜(dϕ˜)
θ˜(τ > t)
)∣∣∣∣∣
≤
L¯
c0
∣∣∣∣
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)−
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ˜(dϕ˜)
∣∣∣∣
+
L¯
c20
· ‖w‖∞ ·
∣∣∣θ(τ > t)− θ˜(τ > t)∣∣∣ .
By definition and since {τ > t} ∈ Gt,∣∣∣θ(τ > t)− θ˜(τ > t)∣∣∣ ≤ dt(θ, θ˜).
The measures θ, θ˜ are both equivalent to Θν , and their restrictions to Gt are
equivalent to the restriction of Θν to Gt. Denoting by Zt and Z˜t, respectively,
the densities with respect to the restriction of Θν, we have
dt(θ, θ˜) =
1
2
∫
X
∣∣∣Zt(ϕ˜)− Z˜t(ϕ˜)∣∣∣Θν(dϕ˜).
It follows that∣∣∣∣
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ(dϕ˜)−
∫
w(ϕ˜(t))1[0,τ(ϕ˜))(t)θ˜(dϕ˜)
∣∣∣∣
≤ 2‖w‖∞ · dt(θ, θ˜).
Consequently, for all t ∈ [0, T ], all ϕ ∈ X , all θ, θ˜ ∈ Qν,K ,∣∣∣bˆ(t, ϕ, θ)− bˆ(t, ϕ, θ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ L¯
c20
· ‖w‖∞ (2c0 + 1) · dt(θ, θ˜),
which implies (E.2).
APPENDIX F: RELAXED CONTROLS
In the proofs of Section 5, Appendix B and Appendix D, we need the
concept of relaxed controls. For a Polish space S, let RS denote the space
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of all deterministic S-valued relaxed controls over the time interval [0, T ],
that is,
RS
.
= {r : r positive measure on B(S × [0, T ]) : r(S × [0, t]) = t, t ∈ [0, T ]} .
If r ∈ RS , then the time derivative of r exists almost everywhere as a
measurable mapping r˙t : [0, T ] → P(S) such that r(dy, dt) = r˙t(dy)dt. The
topology of weak convergence of measures turns RS into a Polish space.
Notice that RS is compact if S is compact. Any S-valued (Ft)-adapted
process α defined on some filtered probability space (Ω,F ,P) induces an
RS -valued random variable ρ, the corresponding stochastic relaxed control,
according to
ρω
(
B × I
) .
=
∫
I
δα(t,ω)(B)dt, B ∈ B(Γ), I ∈ B([0, T ]), ω ∈ Ω.
The random measure ρ is (Ft)-adapted in the sense that its restriction to
S× [0, t] is Ft-measurable for every t ∈ [0, T ] or, equivalently, that (a version
of) the time derivative process ρ˙· is (Ft)-adapted. For details on relaxed
controls, see, for instance, El Karoui et al. [15] or Kushner [28].
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